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Civil commitment is an often forgotten part of our legal system.

Individuals involved in the civil commitment process have sometimes
been equally neglected and statutorily deprived of their liberty without
fundamental procedural rights. Recently, however, several challenges
against state civil commitment statutes have demonstrated that the
mentally ill are entitled to due process protections. In this article, the
author conducts an extensive analysis of Wyoming's constitutionally.
suspect civil commitment statutes in light of these recent decisions.

A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF
INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENT
IN WYOMING
Robert B. Keiter*
The law in Wyoming governing the involuntary commitment of patients to the state mental hospital has remained
virtually unchanged since 1963 when the current statutes
were adopted.1 The almost total absence of reported challenges to the civil commitment statutory scheme suggests
that the procedure has served its purposes reasonably well.2
Notwithtanding this apparently satisfactory state of affairs,
the present Wyoming involuntary civil commitment statutes
reflect serious constitutional shortcomings, and are unreCopyright@ 1980 by the University of Wyoming
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wyoming; B.A. Cum Laude,

1968, Washington University; J.D. Cum Laude, 1972, Northwestern
University; member of the West Virginia and Idaho Bars.
1. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-101 et seq. (1977).
2. Holm v. State, 404 P.2d 740 (Wyo. 1965). In Holm, the Wyoming Supreme
Court struck down as unconstitutional that portion of Section 25-3-112 (h)
of the Wyoming Statutes which provided that the court "shall not be
bound by the rules of evidence" in an involuntary civil commitment hearing.
The Holm decision is the only reported post-1963 decision in the annotated
statutes under Title 25. See also Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th
Cir. 1968). In Heryford, the Court of Appeals ruled that Section 9-6-504
of the Wyoming Statutes governing commitment of mentally retarded
persons to the state training school was constitutionally defective since
the individual facing commitment was not guaranteed representation by
counsel.
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sponsive to recent developments in the delivery of mental
health services.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear
that civil confinement in a state institution constitutes an
invasion of an individual's constitutionally protected liberty
interests and requires attachment of due process safeguards.'
In Specht v. Patterson' the Court concluded that to label
state commitment proceedings as either "civil" or "criminal"
in nature was constitutionally insignificant; and that the
defendant, who there faced indefinite commitment under a
state sex offender statute, was entitled to the protection of
the due process clause.' O'Connor v. Donaldson' recognized
that constitutionally a state was limited to involuntarily
confining in a mental institution only those persons who were
dangerous or who could not safely survive in freedom.7 At
the conclusion of its 1978-79 term, the Court affirmed the
Specht principle in Addington v. Texas' and Parhamv. J.R.,
two cases specifically addressing the scope of due process
protections to be accorded persons facing state civil commitment proceedings. In Addington, the Court not only recognized that commitment constituted a significant deprivation
of liberty but also noted that "adverse social consequences"
tantamount to enduring stigmatization were likely to accompany an individual committed to a mental institution."
Parhamv. J.R. reaffirmed the Addington conclusions in the
context of the commitment of children to state mental hospitals." With these decisions, the Court has erased all doubt
that substantial constitutional protections extend to state
8. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S.
504 (1972) ; Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Addington v. Texas,
.
U.S ......... , 99 S.Ct. 1804 (1979); Parham v. J.R.,
U.S -.......
99 S.Ct. 2493 (1979). See also Minnesota ex reL Pearson v. Probate
Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1939); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966);
McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
4. Specht v. Patterson, supra note 3.
5. Id. at 608. See also, O'Connor v. Donaldson 422 U.S. 563, 580 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
6. O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra note 5.
7. Id. at 575, 576.
8. Addington v. Texas, supra note 3. In Addington, however, the Curt did
distinguish civil commitment proceedings from criminal proceedings in
ultimately concluding that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof
did not apply in commitment proceedings. 99 S.Ct. at 1810.
9. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3.
10. Addington v. Texas, supra note 3 at 1809.
11. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3 at 2503.
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civil commitment proceedings where vital liberty interests
are at stake.
Drawing upon the Supreme Court's decisions in the
mental health field and extrapolating from the Court's significant expansion of due process and equal protection safeguards in a variety of contexts,12 state and federal courts
have increasingly scrutinized the constitutional underpinnings of local mental health laws and practices. Courts in
Wisconsin,"3 Michigan," Alabama,"1 West Virginia," Nebraska, 7 Pennsylvania, 8 Hawaii," Iowa,2" and Kentucky21
have found multiple constitutional deficiencies in those
states' mental health codes.2" Singular statutory deficiencies have been judicially recognized and overturned in Cali2

fornia," Oregon," Connecticut, the District of Columbia 1
and Utah.27 The courts have made it clear that the protections of the Constitution attach during the commitment process and even after the hospital's doors close behind the
patient.28 Additionally, courts have required incorporation
of alternative treatment methodologies into state commitment
12. See e.g. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (termination of welfare
benefits) ; Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole);
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of a driver's license);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (denial of welfare benefits
based on residency). See also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY THE JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (Harvard 1977).
13. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) vacated and
remanded, 414 U.S. 473 (1973), 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D.Wis. 1974) vacated
and remanded, 421 U.S. 457 (1975), 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D.Wis. 1976).
14. Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D.Mich.
1974).
15. Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala. 1974).
16. State ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro. 202 S.E.2d 109 (W.Va. 1974).
17. Doremus v. Farrell, 407 F. Supp. 509 (D.Neb. 1975).
18. Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D.Pa. 1971).
19. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, 411 F. Supp. 113 (D.Hawaii 1976).
20. Stamus v. Leonhardt, 414 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.Iowa 1976).
21. Kendall v. True, 391 F. Supp. 413 (E.D.Ky. 1975).
22. To be sure, not all recent court challenges to state mental health procedures
have been successful. See, e.g., Coll v. Hyland, 411 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J.
1976); French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp. 1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977); In re
Beverly, 342 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1977) ; See also Parham v. J.R., supra note 3;
Secretary of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania v. Institutionalized Juveniles,
.- - U.S.
099 S.Ct. 2523 (1979).
23. Heap v. Roulet, 23 Cal.3d 219, 590 P.2d 1 (1979).
24. Oregon v. O'Neil, 545 P.2d 97 (Or. 1976).
25. Fasulo v. Arafeh, 173 Conn. 473, 378 A.2d 553 (1977).
26. In re Ballay,
U.S.App. D.C ...
482 F.2d 648 (D.C.Cir. 1973).
27. Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, 469 F. Supp. 424
(D.Utah 1979).
28. See e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) ; Scott v. Plante,
532 F.2d 939 (3rd Cir. 1976) ; Wyatt v. Aderhold, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974) affirming Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 387 (M.D.Ala. 1972).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1980

3

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 15 [1980], Iss. 1, Art. 5

144

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. XV

procedures which previously provided only for indefinite
hospitalization."3
The legislatures of many states, likewise conscious of
serious shortcomings in their mental health codes, have undertaken major statutory revisions to meet perceived or adjudicated constitutional deficiencies. California," Washington,"' Nebraska, 2 West Virginia,33 Hawaii," Minnesota, 5
and Alabama,"6 to name but a few states, have revised their
mental health statutes to assure procedural fairness during
commitment proceedings, and to incorporate and utilize the
concept of community based mental health care into their
procedures. Likewise, legal commentators have not hesitated
to examine and expose perceived deficiencies in state mental
health practices. 7 Consequently, the legal protections accorded mental patients have increased dramatically during
the past decade as states have striven to meet their constitutional obligations.
Despite these developments, Wyoming commitment procedures have remained unchanged during the past sixteen
years. For the year ending June 30, 1978, 806 persons were
admitted to the Wyoming state hospital in Evanston for
evaluation, care and treatment for an average stay of 44
days. Over one quarter of these patients were committed
29. See e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13; Lnych v. Baxley, supra note
15; Doremus v. Farrell, supra note 17.
30. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5000 et. seq. (1969) (West).
31. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.010 et. seq. (1976).
32. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1001 et. seq. (1976).
33. W. VA. CODE § 27-5-1 et. seq. (1974).
34. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334-59 et. seq. (1976).
35. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.01 et. seq. (1971).
36. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 52-1 et. seq. (1975).
37. See e.g., Lockney, Constitutional Problems with Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill in North Dakota, 52 N.D. L. REV. 83 (1975); Bezanson,
Involuntary Treatment of the Mentally Ill in Iowa: The 1975 Legislation,
61 IOWA L. REV. 261 (1975); Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill
in Kentucky, 62 Ky. L. J. 769 (1974).
38. See 1978 Report from the Wyoming State Hospital, p. 30, published in the
1978 ANNUAL

REPORT OF THE BOARD OF CHARITIES AND REFORM. (Oct. 16,

1978) (hereinafter cited as 1978 ANNUAL REPORT). It should be noted that
the 806 admissions during 1977-78 included 343 first time admissions, 384
readmissions, and 79 patients returned from convalescent leave. See also
the testimony of Dr. William N. Karn, Superintendent of the Wyoming
state hospital, before the Subcommittee of the Joint Judiciary Interim
Committee on Involuntary Commitment Procedures, June 8, 1979 (hereinafter cited as the Joint Interim Subcommittee). A copy of the minutes
from the Subcommittee hearings is on file in the office of the LAND &
WATER LAW REVIEW.
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involuntarily, and nearly one half of them were readmissions." During the past five years the state hospital has
recorded over 3,800 admissions.40 While Wyoming compares
favorably to national averages for admissions to the state
hospital and for average length of stay,' it still is significant
that those 806 persons were not accorded by statute
the minimum constitutional protections to which they
were entitled. Moreover, Wyoming district court judges
who are charged with the responsibility of handling commitment cases in the first instance, apparently recognizing statutory deficiencies, have tended to adopt their own local variations on the mandated procedures preliminary to commitment." These practices differ noticeably from district to district, undercutting any standard of statewide uniformity. 3 Additionally, the present statutory framework
makes no provision for community based treatment alternatives.44 The court has the unenviable choice of either committing an individual to the state hospital for an indefinite
period of time or refusing commitment, thereby assuring
that, in all likelihood, the individual will receive no treatment for the condition which brought him to the court's
attention in the first place. And as energy impact continues
to make itself felt in Wyoming communities, it is reasonable
to predict that the incidence of mental illness will accelerate.45
39. See 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 30, 33. From July 1, 1977
to June 30, 1978, 208 persons were involuntarily committed to the state
hospital, and 384 persons were readmitted as patients, not including the
79 patients returned to the hospital from convalescent leave status.
40. See 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 30.
41. See Stone, Mental Health and the Law: A System in Transition 41 (Dept.

of Health Education and Welfare, National Institute of Mental Health
1975) (hereinafter cited as Stone). During 1971, the median length of stay
of patients admitted to state and county mental hospitals was 41 days.
See also, SURVEY AND REPORTS BRANCH, DIVISION OF BIOMETRY AND EPIDEMIOLOGY,
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, ADDITIONS AND
RESIDENT PATIENTS AT END OF YEAR FOR STATE AND COUNTY MENTAL
HOSPITALS BY AGE AND DIAGNOSIS, BY STATE, UNITED STATES 1976 (Sept.

1978).
42. Testimony of Dr. William N. Karn and Steve Aron, Attorney at Law,
before the Joint Interim Subcommittee, supra note 38.
43. Id.
44. Wyoming presently is able to assure access to a community based mental
health program for every citizen in the state, but is only able to provide
comprehensive local care for approximately one half of the state. Testimoney of W. Don Nelson, Director of the Department of Health and Social
Services and Dr. Ray Muhr, Southeast Wyoming Mental Health Center,
45.

before the Joint Interim Subcommittee, supra note 38.
See Watson, Measuring and Mitigating Socio-Economic Environmental

Impacts of Constructing Energy Projects: An Emerging Regulatory Issue,
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The Wyoming legislature has not been blind to the problems existing under the present statutory system. Several
efforts to revise Title 25 of the Wyoming Statutes have been
introduced, only to fail, as much through inattention as
hostility." For instance, during the 1979 legislative session,
House Bill 134, which represented a thorough overhaul of
the existing law, was introduced and passed in the House by
a 61-1 vote late in the legislative session. But it died in the
Senate on General File at the end of the session despite a
"do pass" recommendation from the Senate committee which
reviewed it.47 Nevertheless, at the conclusion of the 1979
legislative session a joint House and Senate subcommittee
was appointed from the Judiciary Committee to study the
state's civil commitment laws and to present recommended
changes to the full body for the 1981 session. As this article
intends to demonstrate, their efforts are critical to assuring
that Wyoming mental health law is brought into conformance
with current constitutional standards, and further that it
reflects a farsighted and resourceful approach to dealing
with the problems of the state's mentally ill citizens.
In addressing perceived constitutional deficiencies with
the present Wyoming law, this article will first outline the
civil commitment process established under Title 25 of the
Wyoming Statutes. Next the article will address the sufficiency of the existing statutory standards governing commitment to the state hospital. The doctrine of the least
restrictive alternative and its implementation in state civil
commitment proceedings will be explored. The article then
will examine the procedural framework implementing emergency commitment to the state hospital. The procedures
10 NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 393 (1978); DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT OF COAL RESOURCES IN THE EASTERN POWDER RIVER COAL BASIN OF

WYOMING, Vol. I, pp. 428-437 (1974).
46. In 1975, a bill to revise the commitment procedures was introduced in
the Senate and passed by the Senate on a 21-7 vote after amendment,
but it then died in a House committee. DIGEST OF SENATE JOURNAL, 43rd
Legis. Gen. Sess. 114-116 (1975). In 1977, another bill revising the procedure was introduced in the House, but it died at the conclusion of the
legislative session after being placed on General File. DIGEST OF HOUSE
JOURNAL, 44th Legis. Gen. Sess. 411 (1977). Again, in 1979, a bill revising
the commitment procedures was passed by the House, but died in the
Senate. DIGEST OF HOUSE JOURNAL, 45th Legis. Gen. Sess. 139-140 (1979).
47. DIGEST OF HOUSE JOURNAL, 45th Legis. Gen. Sess. 139-140 (1979).
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governing the conduct of involuntary commitment hearings
will be scrutinized. Then the statutory provisions governing
hospital review, release and transfer decisions will be examined. In conclusion, suggestions and recommendations
for change will be set forth.
I. WYOMING COMMITMENT PROCEDURES

Presently Wyoming law provides for the commitment of
mentally ill persons to the state hospital by either voluntary
or involuntary procedures. An individual may voluntarily
place himself in the state hospital as a patient if he has
sufficient insight to make application to the hospital for
assistance.48 So long as the hospital examines the patient
within ten (10) days after his admission and agrees that his
admission is appropriate," the individual may remain voluntarily until he requests his release."0 Alternatively, an individual who is mentally ill5 ' and either 1) likely to injure
himself or others if not hospitalized, or 2) in need of care or
treatment in a hospital and lacking the capacity to apply for
his own admission to the hospital, may be involuntarily committed to the state hospital either on a short or long term
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-106(a)(i) (1977). The statutory provision applies to
competent adults, while minors or incompetent adults may be voluntarily
admitted to the hospital upon application by their parents or legal
guardians. This voluntary admission procedure for minors and incompetents provides them with no formal procedural safeguards such as
notice of the commitment decision or the opportunity to be heard in
opposition to the decision prior to commitment. However, WYO. STAT.
§ 25-3-117 (1977) requires an immediate examination of the patient upon
his admission by the hospital staff, and their concurrence that hospitalization is appropriate, otherwise the person must be discharged. This provision
should meet minimum due process requirements in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Parham v. J.R., supra note 3, and Secretary of
Public Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, supra note 22, where the
Court upheld similar Georgia and Pennsylvania practices against constitutional due process attack.
49. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-117 (1977).
50. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-108(a) (1977). Significantly, once a patient voluntarily
admitted under WYO. STAT. § 25-3-106(a) (i) (1977) requests his release,
the hopital is not obligated to release the patient, but may institute involuntary commitment proceedings. Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-108(a) (iv) (1977).
It has been shown that the possibility or threat of a judicially mandated
involuntary commitment frequently will deter patients from exercising
their right to request release from their voluntary patient status. See
Gilboy and Schmidt, Voluntary Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill, 66
Nw. U. L. REv. 429 (1971). See also Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally
Ill in Wisconsin: A Need for a Re-examination, 51 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 11-14
(1967).
51. A "mentally ill individual" is defined as "an individual having a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs his mental health."
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-101 (a) (i) (1977).

48.
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basis.2 Virtually anyone, including a friend, spouse, peace
officer or the head of any institution, may initiate involuntary commitment proceedings so long as their application is
accompanied by the appropriate physician's certificate."
Considerable ambiguity appears on the face of the statutory procedures governing short term or emergency involuntary commitment. Short term hospitalization may be accomplished through certification of a physician who has
examined the patient and certified that the individual's condition meets the noted commitment standards. 4 If the basis
for the commitment is the individual's mental illness and
potential dangerousness to himself or others, then he is entitled to an "appropriate hearing" in the district court
before hospitalization commences." However, if the basis
for the individual's hospitaliation is his mental illness and
his lack of capacity to make responsible application for his
own hospitalization, then he apparently is not entitled to the
benefit of judicial intervention before his commitment commences.5 The nature of the required precommitment hear52. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-106 (a) (ii) (1977), (short term admission by certificate of a medical officer); WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112 (1977), (involuntary
civil commitment after a judicial hearing).
53. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-106(a) (ii) (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-110(a) (1977);
WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(b) (1977).
54. WYo. STAT. §§ 25-3-106(a) (ii) and 25-3-110(c) (1977). Admission and
detention under this latter provision does not necessarily require a
physician's certification that the individual's condition meets the commitment standards; rather a public health, welfare or peace officer who
has the individual in his custody also is authorized to state his belief
that the individual is mentally ill and potentially dangerous to himself
or others and the hospital then is authorized to receive the patient.
55. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-110(b) (1977).
(1977). It is noteworthy that Wyo.
56. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-106(a) (ii) (C)
STAT. § 35-2-110(a), (b) and (c) (1977), which require a judicial hearing
before involuntary placement in the hospital, only apply to commitments
where the basis of the commitment is dangerousness to self or others.
Commitment under the standard of mental illness and lack of capacity
to provide for his own hospitalization does not call for a judicial hearing
prior to placement in the hospital. WYO. STAT. § 25-1-110(b) (1977).
The only basis for the difference in the procedural safeguards accorded
the two classes of involuntary mental patients would be an apparent
legislative judgment that since commitment under the dangerousness
standard entailed exercise of the state's police power, it was tantamount
to preventive detention, and thus required some procedural regularity
to permit the individual to judicially test the validity of his detention;
whereas commitment under the lack of capacity standard involved exercise of the state's parens patriae authority and thus did not call for the
same procedural safeguards since the purpose of the hospitalization was
to treat the patient rather than detain him. See Developments in the
Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190, 12071212, 1223 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Developments).
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ing for potentially dangerous persons is not precisely specified but the individual has the right to appear and testify
and to be accompanied by counsel." The statute makes no
provision for notice of the proceedings to the individual, nor
for appointed counsel. It would appear that this hearing was
intended as an informal proceeding preliminary to an emergency commitment to the hospital, and was not intended to
serve as a full adversary hearing." Once an individual is
committed to the state hospital under these procedures he is
entitled to be released from the hospital within ten (10)
days if he applies for his release unless the hospital initiates
formal involuntary commitment proceedings against him
pursuant to Section 25-3-112 of the Wyoming Statutes."
Thus initial hospital commitment may be accomplished with
minimum judicial involvement and with only scant procedural protections available to the prospective patient.
Section 25-3-112 of the Wyoming Statutes sets forth the
standards and procedures governing long term involuntary
commitment to the state hospital. The commitment standard
is the same bifurcated test employed for short term medical
certification commitment: a showing that the individual is
mentally ill and 1) likely to injure himself or others, or 2)
in need of hospital care or treatment but lacking the capacity
to make a responsible decision concerning his hospitalization. ° Although the statute originally contemplated nonadversarial proceedings, 1 the Wyoming Supreme Court
found unconstitutional that portion of the statute which permitted proceedings where the rules of evidence did not apply.6" The court made it clear that involuntary hospitaliza57. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-110(b) (1977).
58. This conclusion is buttressed by the presence of WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112
(1977) which sets forth an alternative procedure for the initiation and
conduct of involuntary commitment proceedings including significant procedural safeguards where commitment apparently is contemplated for a
long period of time. Commitment under Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-112 (1977)
is called for whenever the hospital determines that it would like to
further detain a patient who either was admitted voluntarily or who was
committed by medical certification pursuant to Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-106(a)
(ii) (1977), Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-108(a) (vi) (1977).
59. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-108(a) (1977).
60. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(k) (1977).
61. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(c) (1977) ("Proceedings hereunder shall not be
considered adversary. .. ").
62. Holm v. State, supra note 2. Significantly, the Holm decision did not
comment upon Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-112(c) (1977) which provides that in-
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tion constituted a deprivation of liberty which required procedural regularity under the due process clause."
The commitment hearing may be held in any of three
counties: where the patient is found, where his residence is
located, or where he is hospitalized." Notice of the filing of
an application for involuntary hospitalization must be provided to the individual, but upon a finding that such notice
may be injurious to the person, it is not required. 5 However,
notice of the scheduled commitment hearing must be provided. 6 The individual is entitled to be represented by retained or court appointed counsel." The statute contemplates
that the proposed patient will be present at the hearing and
that he will have the opportunity to present and cross examine witnesses, but his presence is not required." A six person jury is available upon request,"0 and formal evidentiary
rules apply to the proceedings." The statute is either silent
or ambiguous in defining the role of appointed counsel, the
applicable standard of proof, the procedure for waiver of an
individual's presence or his rights, availability of the privilege against self incrimination, and the propriety of medicating the proposed patient before the hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court must decide whether the individual meets the prescribed commitment standards, and if
he does, the court must involuntarily hospitalize him for an
indefinite period of time.7 Alternative dispositions less
drastic than involuntary commitment to the state hospital
are not available to the court.

63.
64.
65.

66.
67.
68.

69.
70.
71.

voluntary commitment proceedings were not to be considered adversary,
finding instead only that the rules of evidence were applicable. Since
the decision excised only that portion of the statute which the court
found objectionable, the remainder of WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112 (1977) survived, and would appear to govern involuntary commitment proceedings.
Id. at 742.
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(a) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(d) (1977). The statute provides that this notice
shall advise the individual of the purpose of the proceedings, the identity
of the court-appointed psychiatric examiner who is responsible for reporting his findings on the individual's mental condition to the court, the
availability of court-appointed counsel, and the contingency that actual
commitment proceedings will depend upon the examiner's report.
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(f) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(g) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(h) (1977).
WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(j) (1977).
Holm v. State, supra note 2.
WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(k) (1977).
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After an individual has been involuntarily committed to
the state hospital, he is entitled to have the hospital re-evaluate the appropriateness of his commitment at six (6) month
intervals and to discharge him if he no longer meets the
commitment criteria. 2 The hospital also has the authority to
release an involuntary patient on convalescent status for a
trial visit or placement outside the institution. 3 Unless the
hospital revokes a patient's convalescent status release, he
is entitled to a discharge from the original involuntary commitment after two (2) years. 4 The hospital also has the
7
authority to transfer patients between state institutions. "
Additionally, the Wyoming Statutes provide that patients
are entitled to humane care and treatment in accordance
with the highest professional standards to the extent that
resources permit.7" Commitment does not deprive a patient
of his civil or contractual rights unless he has been declared
incompetent.77 However, once a patient is committed to the
state hospital, decisions concerning his placement, discharge
and treatment rest with the hospital, which is vested with
considerable discretion in handling the patient."
IL. COMMITMENT STANDARDS

The constitutional basis upon which a state derives its
power to coercively deprive an individual of his liberty for
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-120 (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-121(a) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-121(c) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-119 (1977). In most situations, this means that a
patient may face transfer between the Wyoming state hospital in
Evanston, which is designed to accommodate the mentally ill, and the
Wyoming state training school in Lander, which is designed for the
mentally retarded. Testimony of Dr. William N. Karn before the Joint
Interim Subcommittee, supra note 38.
76. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-122 (1977).
77. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-124(d) (1977). Wyoming statutes also provide that
admission to the state hospital, either voluntarily or involuntarily, does
not create any presumption as to a parson's mental or legal competency,
and that proof beyond the mere fact of admission is necessary to establish
incompetency. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-125 (1977).
78. It should be noted that violation of a patient's statutorily recognized
rights is punishable as a felony. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-141 (1977). Significantly, the statute makes no provision for civil liability in the event
of a statutory or constitutional violation of a patient's rights. In view of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity as interpreted by the Wyoming
Supreme Court, it would be virtually impossible to maintain a civil action
against the state for monetary damages, Worthington v. State of
Wyoming,
P.2d .... (Wyo. 1979), although an action against a state
official acting in his individual capacity may succeed.

72.
73.
74.
75.
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purposes of involuntary treatment in a mental hospital
arises either through the police power or the parens patriae
doctrine.79 Basically, the police power authorizes a state to
take action to protect the public health, welfare, safety and
morals.80 The parens patriae power is predicated upon the
state acting in a protective role to assure the health, welfare,
and well-being of individual citizens who cannot care for
themselves. 8 State civil commitment schemes reflect these
principles in various ways through the statutory standards
governing commitment. The statutes almost uniformly require a showing of mental illness and additionally prescribe
standards encompassing the notion of dangerousness to self
or others, need for care and treatment, the welfare of the
individual or others, and fitness for hospitalization.2 The
Wyoming Statute sets forth a bifurcated, alternative commitment standard which reflects both a police power and
parens patriae rationale: commitment is authorized if the
individual is mentally ill and either 1) likely to injure himself or others or 2) in need of care or treatment and lacking
the capacity to apply for his own hospitalization. 3 Commitment predicated on the state's police power is sanctioned if it
is shown that a mentally ill individual is likely to injure
another person. Commitment predicated either upon the
state's police power or its parens patriae role is justified by
a showing that the individual is likely to injure himself.84
Alternatively, commitment is authorized on a parens patriae
basis upon a showing that a mentally ill individual needs
care or treatment and lacks the capacity to provide for his
own admission to the hospital. Viewed thusly, the Wyoming
79. See Matter of Josiah Oakes, 8 LAw REP. 123, 125 (Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, 1845); Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 389391. See also Developments, supra note 56, at 1201-1245.
80. See Jacob.on v. MaoFachuce.ts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-25 (1905); State v.
Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938).
81. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972), quoting 3 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 47; State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra
note 16, at 117-120;

Holm v. State, supra note 2, at 741.

["[T]he 1963

law (Wyoming civil commitment statute) is a well-intentioned statute
meant to protect people who are thought to be mentally ill. We agree
with this statement .... ." 404 P.2d at 741.]
82.

See Developments, supra note 56, at 1202-1204.

83. WYO. STAT. §§ 25-3-106 (a) (ii) ; 25-3-112 (1977).
84. See Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 390 (distinguishing police power
and parens patriae commitment rationale

ousness to

and concluding

that danger-

elf reflected parens patriae notions).
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commitment statutes provide the state with rather broad authority to involuntarily hospitalize a variety of individuals
suffering from mental disorders.
The constitutionality of the Wyoming statutory commitment standards appropriately is measured under substantive due process concepts. 5 Recent Supreme Court decisions have established that where the state acts to deprive
an individual of a right as fundamental as his liberty, the
state must demonstrate a compelling justification for its
action and choose narrowly tailored means.86 Necessarily,
therefore, the question posed by the Wyoming civil commitment standards is whether the state's exercise of its police
power or its parens patriae role represents a compelling
enough justification and the least restrictive means available
in view of the substantial liberty deprivation entailed in
involuntary hospitalization. 7 Subsidiary to this main issue
is whether the Wyoming standards can withstand a constitutional vagueness challenge."8 Several recent lower court decisions considering state commitment standards suggest that
constitutional problems are evident on the face of similar
statutes and that the statutes only can be saved, if at all,
with a narrowing judicial interpretation. 9
The Supreme Court has not yet directly considered the
constitutional validity of state involuntary civil commitment
85. See Jackson v. Indiana, supra note 3, at 731-739; Doremus v. Farrell,
supra note 17, at 514.
86. Humphrey v. Cady, supra note 3, at 509. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
115 (1973).
87. See Addington v. Texas, supra note 3, at 1809. Consequences of involuntary mental hospitalization include, among other things, loss of liberty, the
likelihood of being subjected to coercive treatment, infringement of privacy,
possible loss of civil rights such as the right to vote, serve on a jury,
obtain a driver's license and social stigmatization. See generally, Developments, supra note 56, at 1193-1201; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at
1088-1090. Significantly, commitment in Wyoming does not automatically
trigger a finding of incompetency, Wyo. STAT. §§ 25-3-121, 25-3-124(d)
(1977), thus the individual does not necessarily lose his civil rights. However, he does face the prospect of undesired, coercive treatment, Wyo. STAT.
§ 25-3-123 (1977), and the above noted social consequences almost inevitably
can be expected to flow from an involuntary commitment.
88. See Kendall v. True, supra note 21, at 418; Bell v. Wayne County General
Hospital, supra note 14, at 1096; Stamus v. Leonhardt, supra note 20, at
452.
89. See e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note
15; State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16; But see In re Beverly,
supra note 22; Fhagen v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278 N.E.2d 615 cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
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standards ;"O however, its recent decisions concerning tangential legal issues in the mental health field provide some guidance in evaluating the Wyoming commitment standards2
In invalidating Indiana's commitment scheme for mentally
incompetent criminal defendants, the Court observed that
"due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for
which the individual is committed."9 In 1972, the Court
upheld a Wisconsin mentally disordered sex offender statute
which sanctioned commitment upon the showing of a "mental disease to such extent that a person so afflicted requires
care and treatment for his own welfare, or the welfare of
others, or of the community.""3 In approving this standard,
the Court interpreted it to encompass necessarily the notion
that a person's "potential for doing harm, to himself or to
others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment
of liberty." 4 Three years later, in O'Connor v. Donaldson,"
the Court expressed its view that commitment solely on the
basis of mental illness was unconstitutional:
90. Justice Blackmun writing for the Court in Jackson v. Indiana, supra note
3, observed:
The States have traditionally exercised broad power to commit
Considering the number of
persons found to be mentally ill. . .
persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the substantive
consitutional limitations on this power have not been more frequently litigated. 406 U.S. at 736-37 (footnotes omitted).
Notwithstanding Justice Blackmun's observations, the Court demonstrated
a real reluctance to review the 1972 Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13,
decision of a three judge federal district court in Wisconsin, where the
lower court had directly addressed the issue of the constitutionality of
Wisconsin commitment standards. Twice the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the lower court's decision on procedural grounds. Lessard v.
Schmidt, supra note 13. See also Fhagan v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278
N.E.2d 615 cert. denied 409 U.S. 845 (1972).
91. See cases cited note 3, supra. See also O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra
note 5. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966).
92. Jackson v. Indiana, supra note 3, at 738.
93. Humphrey v. Cady, supra note 3.
94. Id. at 509.
95. O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra note 5. O'Connor involved appeal of a jury
verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff in a civil rights action alleging
that the actions of the superintendent of a Florida state hospital and
other personnel in confining him in the hospital, allegedly because of his
mental condition, had deprived him of his constitutional due process rights.
Although plaintiff successfully raised and argued the novel proposition
that he possessed a constitutional right to treatment before the court of
appeals, 483 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), the Supreme Court declined to
pass on this question. 422 U.S. at 570 n. 6, 572. Instead, the Court upheld
plaintiff's due process theory that defendants' actions constituted a
violation of his right to liberty. 422 U.S. at 576.
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A finding of "mental illness" alone cannot justify a
State's locking a person up against his will and
keeping him indefinitely in simple custodial confinement. Assuming that that term can be given a
reasonably precise content and that the "mentally
ill" can be identified with reasonable accuracy,
there is still no constitutional basis for confining
such persons involuntarily if they are dangerous to
no one and can live safely in freedom. 96
The Court in O'Connor specifically declined to address the
issue of whether involuntary commitment based upon the
state's parens patriae authority was constitutionally sanctioned. 7 The Court's decisions concerning state juvenile delinquency procedures, an area where the parens patriae rationale had long applied, tended to discredit the state's parens
patriae authority as it concerned minors, therefore suggesting that its applicability to the mentally ill likewise was suspect."8 However, the Court's recent decision in Addington v.
Texas suggests that the parens patriae rationale is constitutionally valid as a basis for civil commitment: "The state has
a legitimate interest under its parens patriae power in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional
disorders to care for themselves. . . ."" Thus, the Court has
96. Id. at 575.
97. Id. at 571. ("[Tlhere is no reason now to decide . . . whether the State may
compulsorily confine a nondangerous, mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment.") But see O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra note 5, at 583
(Burger, C.J., concurring) ["[Tihe States are vested with the historic
parens patriae power, including the duty to protect persons under legal
disabilities to act for themselves." (citations omitted)].
98. The confusion stemmed from the Court's rulings in a series of juvenile
cases where the Court indicated that although the state professed an
intention to act benevolently toward minors accused of criminal offenses,
the state's parens patriae intentions more often were honored in the
breach, as children found themselves indefinitely confined to outdated
and unhealthful detention facilities upon findings of delinquency, without
the benefit of basic constitutional due process protections. See Kent v.
United States, supr, note 91; In re Gault, supra note 91, at 27; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970). Lower courts confronting similar constitutional due process challenges to state civil commitment schemes analogized
the proceedings and concluded that the parens patriae power was an inadequate basis upon which civil commitment could be justified. See Dixon v.
Attorny General, supra note 18, at 972; State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro,
supra note 16, at 120. Cf. Heryford v. Parker, supra note 2, at 396 ("civilcriminal" label is irrelevant for due process purposes).
99. Addington v. Texas, supra note 3 at 1809. The quoted passage seems to be
dictum, but Chief Justice Burger was speaking for a unanimous Court;
Justice Powell took no part in the consideration of the case. Cf. Parham v.
J.R., supra note 3, at 2505. In Parham, the Court recognized the state's
parens patriae interest in assisting parents to care for the mental health
of their children.
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restored the vitality of the parens patriae doctrine, at least
in the context of state provision of care and treatment for
the mentally ill who may harm themselves absent state intervention. Additionally, Addington explicitly recognized the
state's police power to protect the community from dangerous
mentally ill persons." 0
Lower courts faced with mounting challenges to civil
commitment standards consistently have relied upon the
state's police power in upholding statutory criteria permitting commitment on the basis of dangerousness to others, 1 '
even while several have struck down or limited parens patriae
based commitment standards.0 2 For instance, the seminal
Lessard v. Schmidt ruling, while upholding Wisconsin's commitment standards, construed rather broad statutory language to permit commitment only in those cases where the
state demonstrated that there was "an extreme likelihood
that if the person is not confined he will do immediate harm
to himself or others."'0 ° The court further required that dangerousness must be based upon a finding that the individual
has committed a recent overt act, attempt, or threat to do
substantial harm to himself or another. 4 The proscriptive
Lessard ruling has been widely followed by other courts confronted with similar constitutional attacks on state commitment standards. 10 5 Subsequent rulings have distinguished
the constitutional basis underlying the Lessard rationale,
noting that while the state's police power justifies commitment based on the substantial likelihood of harm to others,
it is the parens patriae doctrine which underlies commitment predicated upon the likelihood of injury to self. 6
100. Id. at 1809.
101. See e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, supra, note 13; Lynch v. Baxley, supra
note 15, Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, supra, note 14; State
ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16; Wessel v. Pryor, 461 F. Supp. 1144
(E.D.Ark. 1978).
102. See e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, id. (limiting parens patriae commitment)
Lynch v. Baxley, id. (limiting parens patiae commitment) ; State ex rel.
Hawks v. Lazaro, id. (striking down parens patriae commitment).
103. Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13. at 1093.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15; Bell v. Wayne County General
Hospital, supra note 14; State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16.
106. Lynch v. Baxley, Rupra note 15, at 390; Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for
Salt Lake County, supra note 27, at 431; See also, Developments, supra
note 56, at 1223-1228.
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While the dangerousness standard has been widely accepted as constitutionally sound by the courts, the notion that
the state can commit persons for the purpose of care and
treatment if it determines that this is in their best
interests has not been as widely accepted. In State ex rel.
Hawks v. Lazaro the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, after exhaustively examining and ultimately discrediting the state's historic parens patriaepower, found unconstitutional that portion of the West Virginia Code which permitted commitment based upon an individual's need for care
or treatment where the person lacked the capacity to provide
for his own hospitalization." 7 Similarly, federal district
courts have found that parens patriae based commitment is
unconstitutional.0 8 Other courts, though accepting a parens
patriae rationale as a basis for state action, have limited
commitment to only those cases in which the state met its
burden of demonstrating a compelling interest by showing
that the individual posed an imminent threat to his own wellbeing.'
The traditional notion that the parens patriae
power justifies state intervention via involuntary hospitalization upon a showing that an individual is mentally ill or
that commitment would be in the individual's best interests
no longer passes constitutional muster.
Additionally, the courts have scrutinized state commitment standards to assure that they are not fatally overbroad. Courts in Michigan,"' Kentucky,'1 ' Iowa"' and
Utah.. have ruled that those states' statutory commitment
standards were impermissibly vague. Michigan required
simply a showing of mental illness," 4 while Kentucky, Iowa
and Utah required a showing of mental illness coupled with
the need or fitness for custody or treatment."' In each in107. State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16, at 123.
108. Kendall v. True, supra note 21; Dixon v. Attorney General, supra note 10.
109. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15; Doremus v. Farrell, supra
note 17; Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supra note
27; Wessel v. Pryor, supra note 101; State v. O'Neil, 545 P.2d 97 (Or.
1976).
110. Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, supra note 14.
111. Kendall v. True, supra note 21.
112. Stamus v. Leonhardt, supra note 20.
113. Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supra note 27.
114. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 330.21, 330.54 (1967).
115. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.100 (1970) (Baldwin); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 229.1, 229.9 (1949) (West) ; UTAH CODE ANN, § 64-7-36(6) (1953).
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stance the courts objected that the statutory guidelines were
inadequate to cabin the essentially unbridled discretion which
was granted to the decisionmakers at civil commitment
hearings.
The courts also have appeared troubled by the inclusion
of the term "mental illness" as a necessary element in statutory commitment standards."' Michigan" ' and Hawaii"..
courts have stricken down commitment standards predicated
solely on mental illness. Legal and medical commentators
have reached the almost universal conclusion that the term
is inherently imprecise and perhaps incapable of concrete
definition:
[T]he definition of mental illness is left largely
to the user and is dependent upon the norms of adjustment that he employs. Usually the use of the
phrase "mental illness" effectively masks the actual
norms being applied ....

[T]he diagnostician has

the ability to shoehorn into the mentally diseased
class almost any person he wishes, for whatever
reason, to put there."'
Statutory definitional attempts, frequently circular or ambiguous in nature, generally fail to give the term any content. "' Consequently, for years the courts have been at the
whim of the medical profession relying exclusively upon
116. See e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1094; Doremus v. Farrel,
supra note 17, at 513.
117. Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, supra note 14.
118. Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra note 19.
119. Livermore, Malmquist and Meehl, On the Justifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 80 (1968). See also Postel, Civil Commitment:
A FunctionalAnalysis, 38 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 34 (1971) ("Mental illness"
embraces an enormous variety of disorders, functional and organic. Psychiatric nomenclature encompasses a truly vast number of disturbances
of mental functioning, and each of these disturbances is capable of an
inordinate concatenation of symptoms and shadings."); Dix, Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill in Wisconsin, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 111, n. 40 (1967) ;
Hardisty, Mental Illness: A Legal Fiction, 48 WASH. L. REV. 735 (1973)
(the author asserts that the terms "mental illness" or "mental disease"
have no accepted medical meaning, and that to predicate legal determinations on these terms obscures important underlying decisions and
judgments which are being made); Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal
Process: A Knife that Cuts Both Ways, 4 TRIAL 29 (Feb.-Mar. 1968).
120. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5125(4) (Cum. Supp. 1970) (mental
illness is defined as "any condition which substantially impairs an individual's mental health"); IDAHO CODE § 66-317 (Supp. 1972) (a mentally
ill individual is one who is "in such mental condition that he is in need of
supervision, treatment, care or restraint"). See also, Developments, supra
note 56, at 1202.
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medical judgment in determining abnormal behavior and
deciding whether commitment is appropriate. 2 ' Largely in
recognition of this fact, the recent court decisions and statutory revisions reflect an attempt to bring objective criteria
(e.g., dangerousness to self or others manifested by overt
acts, attempts or threats) into the commitment decision to assure that minimal constitutional standards of clarity are met.
Nevertheless, the difficult problem of defining mental illness
persists, and renders suspect statutory schemes which fall
far short of the mark of precision and clarity.
In evaluating the Wyoming commitment standards it
will be helpful to examine and measure each of the component parts against the above cited developments. As in most
states, commitment in Wyoming requires initially a finding
that the individual is mentally ill.'
Wyoming statutes define a mentally ill individual as "an individual having a psychiatric or other disease which substantially impairs his
'
mental health."123
None of the operative definitional terms
(e.g., disease, substantial impairment of mental health) are
elsewhere defined in the statute. The definition appears circular: impaired mental health is determinative of mental
illness. Also, mental illness is defined in medical terms; thus,
the court is forced to rely almost exclusively upon a medical
judgment in deciding whether the person facing commitment
meets at least the necessary element of being mentally ill,
notwithstanding the inevitable subjectivity of such judgments: "[T]he commitment decision is a process of social
definition, of rejection by society, of deviance from norms of
behavior; there is nothing honestly scientific, let alone medical, about it."... 4 While it is admittedly difficult (perhaps
impossible) to define mental illness precisely, the law fairly
can demand a more exacting standard than that set forth in
121. Dershowitz, supra note 119, at 29; Dix, supra note 119 at 1.
122. WYO. STAT. §§ 25-3-106(a) (ii), 25-3-112 (1977). See Developments, supra
note 56, at 1202.
123. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-101 (a) (i) (1977).
124. Shaffer, Introduction, Symposium: Mental Illness, the Law and Civil
Liberties, 13 SANTA CLARA LAwYER 369 (1973). See also Roth, Dayley and
Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric Reliability and Emergency Commit-

ment Statutes, id. at 400.
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this statute."' Failure to do so arguably renders the commitment standards unconstitutionally vague,' although a
court recognizing the inherent definitional problem may be
willing to salvage the statute by relying upon the accompanying standards of dangerousness or need for care or treatment to provide necessary objective criteria upon which a
legal judgment may be based. 27
Nevertheless, for constitutional purposes, the incorporation into the definition of mental illness of nonmedical
terminology reflecting behavioral characteristics, rather than
the present conclusory medical terminology, could provide a
more objective basis upon which courts might determine
whether commitment is appropriate."' 8 For instance, Ohio
defines a mentally ill person as an individual with a disorder
which "substantially impairs the capacity of the person to
use self-control, judgment and discretion in the conduct of
his affairs."'2 9 Alternatively, Washington defines "mental
disorder" as "any organic, mental or emotional impairment
which has substantial adverse effects on an individual's cognitive or volitional functions."' 3 ° A more functional definition expressed in behavioral terms would restore to the
courts their proper role of deciding whether commitment is
appropriate rather than abdicating this judgment to the
medical profession. After all, the commitment decision treads
At least
upon significant constitutional liberty interests.'
such a definitional change should serve to insulate that por125. Cf. Durham v. United States, 94 U.S. App. D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.
Cir. 1954) and United States v. Brawner, ....... U.S. App. D.C-. , 471
F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Durham, the Court of Appeals adopted a
purely medical model definition for criminal insanity: "an accused is not
responsible if his unlawful act was the product of a mental disease or
defect." 214 F.2d at 874. After 18 years of experimentation with the socalled "Durham Rule" the Court, in Brawner, concluded that it was an
unworkable legal standard and reversed Durham adopting the American
Law Institute standard to define insanity. See generally, Dershowitz,
supra note 119.
126. See e.g., Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, supra note 14; Suzuki v.
Quisenberry, supra note 19; Stamus v. Leonhardt, supra note 20.
127. See e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13; Doremus v. Farrell, supra
note 17. See also, Developments, supra note 56, at 1258.
128. Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 379,
398 (1973); Wexler and Scoville, The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 Aaiz. L. REV. 1, 65 (1971).
129. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(A) (Page Supp. 1972).
130. WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71.05.020(2) (West 1975).
131. Humphrey v. Cady, supra note 3, at 509; Addington v. Texas, supra note 3,
at 1809.
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tion of the statute from a vagueness challenge while providing additional guidance and clarity to the lawyers and
judges involved in commitment hearings.
Every court which has considered whether the state's
police power sanctions involuntary commitment based upon
a determination that an individual is mentally ill and potentially dangerous to others has concluded that the state may
constitutionally deprive an individual of his liberty and commit him to a mental institution on this basis. 3 ' The underlying due process rationale recognizes that the state has a
compelling interest in protecting its citizens from harm, and
that commitment may represent the least restrictive alternative available to the state to fulfill its responsibility.' 33
Notwithstanding the preventive detention implications... and
the lurking equal protection problems evident where the mentally ill and non-mentally ill are treated differently despite
equivalent dangerous propensities,13 the courts have sustained such police power-grounded commitments. Likewise,
courts considering the validity of dangerousness to self commitment standards have had no diffiulty upholding them.""
Thus, the Wyoming statutory commitment standard of mental illness and likelihood of injury to self or others appears
constitutionally sound on its face.
Although similar statutory dangerousness standards
have been upheld by the courts, they have been noticeably
narrowed by judicial interpretation to meet due process requirements. Psychiatric predictions of an individual's potential for engaging in future harmful conduct, regardless
of whether he suffers from mental illness, are highly unreliable, usually subjective, and often inherently biased toward
the over-prediction of dangerousness.' 5 Recognizing this,
132. See cases cited note 101, supra.
133. Id.
134. See Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: A Suggested Framework for
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1277 (1973).
135. See Developments, supra note 56, at 1229.
135a. See e.g., cases cited at note 106, supra.
136. Addington v. Texas, supra note 3 at 1811; Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry
and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974). See also Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The
Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 J. CRIME & DELINQUENCY

371 (1972); Rubin, Predictions of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill Criminals,
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courts have found that the state's interest underlying a
dangerousness-based commitment rises to the compelling
level when the state has demonstrated a substantial likelihood that the individual will engage in conduct harmful to
others, and that this likelihood is manifested by his recent
overt acts, threats or attempts.' The potentially dangerous
conduct comprehends physical, and possibly emotional, injury to others,' but probably not injury to property. 3 ' Bascially, the courts seem to be balancing the magnitude and
likelihood of harm against the individual's liberty interests
in order to satisfy themselves that the stringent due process
criteria are met. 4 ' By incorporating the requirement that
the state prove that the dangerousness prediction is based
upon the individual's recent actions, an objective criteria is
injected into the proceedings, thus releasing the court from
total dependence upon psychiatric predictions and providing
the court with a basis for judgment-a factual inquiry-that
is familiar to it.
This approach appears constitutionally sound, and also
serves procedural due process considerations by safeguarding against erroneous commitment decisions.'
Moreover,
it is constitutionally required that such a showing of dangerousness be made by "clear and convincing evidence," thereby
providing a further safeguard against an erroneous commitment. 2 - Thus, assuming that the Wyoming courts have
137.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

27 ARCH. GEN. PsYCH. 397 (1972); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence
Be Predicted?, 18 J. CRIME & DELINQUENCY 393 (1972).
Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1093; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note
15, at 391. But see United States ex rel. Mathew v. Nelson, 461 F. Supp.
707, 711 (N.D.Ill. 1978) ("We find that there are instances in which a psychiatrist can determine from a psychiatric criminal examination that a
mentally ill person is reasonably likely to injure himself or another even
though the person's history does not include a recent overt act . . .");
Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supra note 27, at
434; Note, Overt Dangerous Behavior as a Constitutional Requirement
for Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 562
(1977).
See Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 391.
Suzuki v. Alba, 438 F. Supp. 1106 (D.Hawaii 1977).
See Note, supra note 137. See also Developments, supra note 56, at 1236.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See also text accompanying notes 233 and 234, infra.
Addington v. Texas, supra note 3. See Section IV, infra, for a discussion
of the standard of proof constitutionally required in civil commitment
proceedings. Additionally, the constitutional argument that commitment
is proper only if it is to the least restrictive environment consistent with
the state's or individual's interests provides an additional safeguard against
inappropriate commitments. See Section III, infra.
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recognized that dangerousness to others as a grounds for
commitment entails a showing of a substantial likelihood
of serious harm to others, the standard should pass constitutional muster. Alternatively, however, refinement of the
dangerousness standard through statutory amendment to
incorporate these additional balancing criteria would further
clarify the commitment standard and provide greater guidance to the courts as they confront the elusive notion of
potential dangerousness.
Wyoming's alternative commitment standard sanctions
involuntary hospitalization upon a showing that an individual is mentally ill and is in need of care or treatment in a
hospital and because of his illness lacks sufficient capacity
to make responsible application in his own behalf. 4 ' Commitment on this basis clearly arises from the state's parens
patriae power.144 The basic question to be addressed is whether the parens patriae rationale represents a compelling
enough state interest to meet substantive due process requirements in view of the liberty interests involved in civil
commitment. 4 As noted, the Supreme Court recently has
suggested in Addington v. Texas that the parens patriae
doctrine is constitutionally viable in the context of state
commitment proceedings."' Notwithstanding the Addington
language, O'Connor v. Donaldson"' noticeably limits parens
patriae based commitments to those cases where an individual cannot "live safely in freedom" by himself or with the
assistance of family members or friends.' 8 Further, some
lower courts expressly have found commitment standards
phrased in terms of an individual's need for care or treatment unconstitutional, noting that the parens patriae rationale was an inadequate justification.'49 Thus, a court
predisposed against the parens patriae doctrine would likely
143. WYO. STAT. §§ 25-3-106(a) (ii), 25-3-112 (1977).
144. See State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16; In re Beverly, supra
note 22; See also, Developments, supra note 56, at 1209-10.
145. See generally, Developments, supra note 56, at 1210.
146. Addington v. Texas, supra note 3.
147. O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra note 5.
148. Id. at 575-76. See Doremus v. Farrell, laupra note 17, at 514; In re
Beverly, supra note 22, at 486.
149. See State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16; Kendall v. True, supra
note 21; Dixon v. Attorney General, supra note 18. But see, In re Beverly,
supra note 22; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15.
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have little difficulty invalidating the Wyoming care or treatment standard for commitment.
Assuming, however, that the standard could withstand
a challenge on these grounds, it is clear that it can be saved
constitutionally only with a narrowing judicial interpretation to meet the O'Connor guidelines.5 ° The critical question
is not whether the individual requires care or treatment, or
whether he lacks capacity to provide for his own hospitalization; rather it is whether he can survive safely outside of
the restricted hospital environment. The courts which have
provided judicial gloss on similarly worded or intentioned
commitment standards have limited commitment to those
cases where an individual poses a threat to his own health
or safety because of his inability to provide for his basic
personal needs.'
Some courts have further required that
the threat of harm be demonstrated by a recent overt act,
threat or attempt. 5 ' It would seem that accepting this judicial narrowing of the need for care or treatment standard
leads to the conclusion that it is redundant in view of the
alternative dangerousness-to-self standard.'
Therefore, the
standard serves little or no purpose, other than perhaps to
confuse the decision-maker as to the appropriate commitment
standard to be applied.
Additionally, it has been held that the state must demonstrate not only that continued freedom may be harmful to
the individual but also that he lacks the capacity to decide
about his own hospitalization needs." 4 Essentially this further requirement, which is reflected in the Wyoming standard, suggests that although an individual may potentially
150. Doremus v. Farrell, supra note 17; In re Beverly, supra note 22; Wessel v.
Pryor, supra note 101.
151. Id. Cf. Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supra
note 27. Compare CAL. WELF. AND INST. CODE § 5008(h), 5213,5250 (1969
West) (commitment authorized upon a finding of grave disability which
is defined as the inability of a person as a result of a mental disorder
to provide his basic personal needs for food, clothing or shelter).
152. Doremus v. Farrell, supra note 17, at 515; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note
15, at 391; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1093. But see Colyar v.
Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supra note 27, at 434.
153. Wyo. STAT. §§ 25-3-106(a) (ii) (A) and (B) ; 25-3-112(k) (1977).
154. Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13. at 1094; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note
15, at 391; Wessel v. Pryor, supra note 101, at 1148; Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supra note 27, at 431. See also, Developments, supra note 56, at 1212.
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be harmful to himself, if he has the capacity to weigh the
risk of harm to himself against the benefits of hospitalization, then it is inappropriate to commit him to an institution
against his wishes.' 5 This principle fully prevails in the
instance of physically ill persons who can decide for themselves whether to accept or risk various treatments,'56 and
it would seem likewise to apply here so long as the individual
capably recognizes and willingly accepts the risks entailed
in freedom. Not all mental illnesses impair an individual's
decision-making abilities.5 7 Thus, that aspect of the Wyoming standard which embraces an individual's lack of capacity to make responsible application for his own hospitalization could be retained, so long as its application is directly
coupled to the notion that commitment can only be predicated upon a showing of likelihood of personal injury and
lack of capacity to decide about hospitalization needs. This
should meet the basic parens patriae rationale which places
the state essentially in the role of a substitute decision-maker
for the individual, responsible for proceeding in his best
interests.
Moreover, the Wyoming care or treatment standard suffers from potential vagueness problems.'
The standard
suggests a certain circularity of reasoning and can be applied in a Catch 22 fashion: care or treatment is proffered
through the commitment proceedings and the individual objects; his objection establishes his lack of capacity to decide
about his own hospitalization and his need for care or treat5 9 In addition, since the requirement of establishing
ment."
155. See Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supa note 27.
156. Dershowitz, Psychiatry in the Legal Process: A Knife that Cuts Both
Ways, supra note 119.
157. Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supra note 27, at
430, 431; Comment, Involuntary Civil Commitment of the Nondangerous
Mentally Ill: Substantive Limitations. 18 So. DAK. L. REV. 407, 416 (1973);
Siegel, The Justifications for Medical Commitment-Real or Illusory,
6 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REV. 21, 31-33 (1969).

158. See e.g., State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16:
The standard of ho.spitalization for the benefit of the individual
leaves an entirely subjective determination for the committing
authority which violates due process because it forecloses a meaningful appeal and places the individual in jeopardy of losing his
freedom without providing an objective standard against which
the committing authority's determination can be measured. (citations omitted.) 202 S.E.2d at 123.
159. Colyar v. Third Judicial Court for Salt Lake County, supra note 27, at 432.
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that the person suffers from mental illness is linked with
the standard of need for care and treatment, the potential
for misapplication increases. The commentators have noted
a tendency on the part of courts handling commitment proceedings under such a standard to simply equate mental illness with a lack of capacity and to sanction commitment on
such bootstrap reasoning.16 The standard is inherently ambiguous, and provides little or no guidance to the decisionmaker in a commitment hearing. While strict judicial interpretation might save it, this standard should be deleted
from the Wyoming Code. As noted, the individual's capacity
to decide for himself about hospitalization could be coupled
with the requirement that a real likelihood of personal harm
be demonstrated before a parens patriae based commitment
would follow.
The importance of coherent, unambiguous commitment
standards is highlighted by the Supreme Court's recent observations in Addington:
At one time or another every person exhibits some
abnormal behavior which might be perceived by
some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable. [T]here is the
possible risk that a factfinder might decide to commit an individual based solely on a few isolated
instances of unusual conduct. Loss of liberty calls
for a showing that the individual suffers from
something more serious than is demonstrated by
idiosyncratic behavior.161
Carefully tailored commitment standards should assure that
inappropriate hospitalizations are avoided while still providing the state adequate leeway to assist its citizens who
suffer severe disorders, rendering them potentially harmful
to themselves or others. Legislative revision or judicial interpretation of the Wyoming standards consistent with the
160. Brakel and Rock, The Mentally Disabled and the Law 36 (1971); Stone,
supra note 41, at 47; Cf. United States v. Brawner, supra note 125, at 983;
Rosenham, supra note 128, at 398; Comment, Involuntary Civil Commitment
of the Nondangerous Mentally Ill: Substantive Limitations, supra note 157,
at 416.
161. Addington v. Texas, supra note 3, at 1809-1810.
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above discussed principles governing the state's police power
or parens patriae authority would promote these goals while
meeting constitutional requirements. Additionally, however,
incorporation of the least restrictive alternative doctrine into the Wyoming commitment scheme would further assure
that the state met its constitutional obligations while validating contemporary mental health practice by encouraging
treatment in a less onerous setting than the state hospital.'
III. LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
Present Wyoming statutory commitment procedures
provide that a court faced with an individual who properly
meets the commitment criteria has but one alternative: to
order his commitment to the state hospital." 3 No flexibility
is available to the court to provide less restrictive alternative
care or treatment,' notwithstanding the substantial body
of contemporary literature in the mental health field recognizing that even short term hospitalization has serious adverse effects on individuals so confined, and that local, community based treatment programs frequently are superior
methods of patient treatment to involuntary hospitalization."' The notion that individuals facing civil commitment
are entitled to treatment in the least restrictive setting derives from the constitutional doctrine of the least restrictive
alternative. 66 The principle has been widely recognized and7
applied judicially to state civil commitment proceedings;1
and it has been incorporated, either explicitly or implicitly,
into the civil commitment statutes of thirty-five (35)
162. See Section III, infra.
163. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(k) (1977).
164. Despite the apparent statutory inflexibility, several Wyoming courts
regularly seek alternatives to involuntary commitment to the state
hospital as part of their conduct of the commitment hearing. Testimony
of Steve Aron, Attorney representing the Wyoming State Bar, before
the Joint Interim Subcommittee, supra note 38.
165. See e.g., Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MIcH. L. REV.
1107, 1121-1137 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Chambers); Wexler and
Scoville, supra note 128, at 118-127.
166. Id. See also, Developments, supra note 56, at 1245.
167. Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1094; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note
15, at 392; Stamus v. Leonhardt, supra note 20, at 452; Davis v. Watkins,
384 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (N.D.Ohio 1974); Dixon v. Attorney General,
supra note 18, at 974; Cf. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 501 (D.
Minn. 1974) (applied to the mentally retarded).
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states.168 Practically, as the district court explained in Lynch
v. Baxley,16 the doctrine requires judicial inquiry into the
suitableness of treatment alternatives such as voluntary or
or court-ordered out-patient treatment, day treatment in the
hospital, night treatment in the hospital, placement in a
private hospital, placement in the custody of a willing and
responsible relative or friend, placement in a nursing home,
referral to a community health clinic, home health aid services, or prescribed medication. 7
In Wyoming the availability of alternative treatment
programs necessarily is limited as a practical matter, owing
both to the state's small population and the long distance
involved in travel from one community to another. But the
state presently can provide professional mental health services to virtually everyone through accessible community mental health programs, although local comprehensive care programs are not yet fully available."' Thus, application of the
doctrine of the least restrictive alternative to Wyoming civil
commitment procedures presently is realistically possible.
This suggests that the all-or-nothing commitment requirement presents constitutional problems.
The constitutional genesis of the least restrictive alternative doctrine generally is traced to Shelton v. Tucker,"2
in which the Supreme Court stated:
[E]ven though the government purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment
must be viewed in light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose.' 73
168. Hoffman and Foust, Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Ill:
A Doctrine in Search of its Senses, 14 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 1100, 1115 (1977).
169.

Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15.

170. Id. at 392.
171. Testimony of W. Don Nelkon, Director of the Wyoming Department of
Health and Social Services, and Dr. Ray Muhr, Southwest Wyoming
Community Mental Health Center, before the Joint Interim Subcommittee,
supra note 38.
172. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
173. Id. at 488.
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Courts construing and applying the Shelton doctrine in the
context of civil commitment have recognized that since involuntary hospitalization involves "a massive curtailment
of liberty," due process requires the state to demonstrate that
the proposed commitment is to the least restrictive environGenment consistent with the patient's treatment needs.'
erally recognizing the inability of a proposed patient to
examine and present these alternatives to the court, the
burden has been placed on the state to show that all less
drastic treatment alternatives have been exhausted before
an individual is committed to a state hospital.17 It should
be noted that there is contrary precedent indicating that the
least restrictive alternative doctrine is not constitutionally
applicable to state civil commitment proceedings,' 6 and its
application has been criticized as stretching the institutional
competence of the courts," ' often engaging them in a futile
inquiry owing to the sad lack of available community treatment alternatives.'
174. See cases cited note 167, supra.
175. See e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1096; Lynch v. Baxley,
supra note 15, at 392.
176. State v. Sanchez, 80 N.M. 438, 457 P.2d 370 (1969), appeal dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question, 396 U.S. 276 (1970). The New
Mexico Supreme Court ruled that the state hs.d no constitutional obligation to consider less drastic alternatives to involuntary hospitalization.
Subsequently the United States Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for
want of a substantial federal question. The matter of Sanchez' precedential value has been questioned seriously, and other courts confronted
with the Supreme Court's disposition of Sanchez either have distinguished
it or felt that they were not bound by it. See Lynch v. Baxley, supra note
15, at 392 n. 10; Welsch v. Likins, supra note 167, at 501; See also, Developments, supra note 56, at 1247; Chambers, supra note 165, at 1151-53.
177. Lake v. Cameron, ....... U.S. App. D.C ........ , 364 F.2d 657, 663 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (Burger, J., dissenting) ("[t]his Court now orders the District
Court to perform functions normally reserved to social agencies by commanding search for a judicially approved course of treatment or custodial
care for this mentally ill person who is plainly unable to care for herself.
Neither this Court nor the District Court is equipped to carry out the
broad geriatric inquiry proposed or to resolve the social and economic
issues involved.") Cf. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3, at 2507 (independent
medical evaluation of propriety of juvenile commitment to a state hospital
is adequate to meet due process requirements; a more formal judicial or
administrative hearing will not necessarily assure any greater protection
to the child).
178. See the decision on remand of the district court in Lake v. Cameron, 267
F. Supp. 155 (D.D.C. 1967), where after exploring a variety of alternatives,
the court was unable to find a suitable alternative placement for the 67
year old Mrs. Lake who suffered from chronic brain syndrome leading
to periodic mental lapses during which time she wandered aimlessly about
the city without knowing where she was. Ultimately, Mrs. Lake lived out
the final five years of her life confined to St, Elizabeth's Hospital, the
maximum security mental institution for the District of Columbia. Chambers, supra note 165, at 1189.
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Regardless, however, of the constitutional basis for the
least restrictive alternative doctrine, and although it necessarily imposes additional burdens on courts in the commitment process, the possibility of an alternative disposition
presents likely therapeutic benefits to the individual,' presages the establishment and maintenance of mutually cooperative relationships between the judiciary, prosecutors,
and local mental health agencies, and is consistent with the
present practices of several Wyoming courts.80 Implementation of the doctrine also would encourage courts to mandate treatment for the mentally ill individual who qualifies
for commitment and seemingly requires some treatment,
although perhaps not hospitalization, rather than to simply
Moreover, judicial utilization of
release the individual.'
the least restrictive alternative doctrine during commitment
hearings presumably would complement existing state hospital treatment policies which provide that patients should
be returned to society at the earliest practicable date.'82
To the extent that local resources can be utilized to
avoid commitment in the first instance, hospital staff time
would be freed to concentrate on seriously ill patients. Additionally, effective local treatment would likely undercut the
"revolving door syndrome" of so many mental patients who
periodically find themselves recommitted to the state hospital
after having difficulties with the community adjustment.' 8
This may ultimately result in a saving of judicial time as
well.
179. See note 165, supra.
180. See note 164, supra.
181. Of course, such an alternative may encourage additional commitments;
however, it would seem that commitment or judicially mandated treatment would be improper unless the individual met the commitment standards in the first instance. See Developments, supra note 56, at 1250.
("The objectives of the
182. 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 1
Wyoming State Hospital are to render, in keeping with sound medical
practices, the best possible patient treatment and care in the most economical
fashion in keeping with sound medical practices: and to return treated
and rehabilitated patients to society at the earliest practicable date.")
183. Id. at 30. A ten year admission survey for the Wyoming state
hospital reflects that from July 1, 1968 to June 30, 1978, the number of
patients readmitted annually varied from 179 during the 1969-70 period,
to 466 during the 1976-77 period. More significantly, during the last two
years of the survey, more patients were admitted to the hospital as
readmissions than were admitted for the first time. In fact, including
patients who were returned from convalescent leave status as readmissions,
during the past five years, the hospital saw more patients for a second
or third time than it saw newly admitted patients.
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Although the present reality in Wyoming may be that
only minimal local mental health resources are available to
implement the least restrictive environment principle, it is
clear that some alternatives are available to the courts. In
view of this, the failure of the statute to provide for dispositions short of commitment to the state hospital raises possible constitutional problems, and it is unresponsive to currently accepted mental health treatment practices. To their
credit, some Wyoming courts already are implementing the
principle, but statutory recognition of the least restrictive
alternative doctrine would assure uniformity in its application and avoid the noted constitutional shortcomings. Moreover, such a statutory provision may well spur the development of sorely needed alternative treatment facilities.184
IV. EMERGENCY COMMITMENT

Emergency commitment procedures in Wyoming are
statutorily prescribed in those cases where an individual is
suspected of being mentally ill and likely to injure himself or
others.'
The statute provides that an individual who is
184. See Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F.Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975); but see Welsch
v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
185. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-110 (1977). However, the Wyoming statutes are not
free of ambiguity on this point since Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-106(a) (ii) (1977)
provides that upon application and certification by a physician, a mentally
ill individual may be admitted to a hospital if he is dangerous to himself
or others, or in need of care or treatment and unable to make responsible
application for his own hospitalization. Seemingly an application for
admission under WYo. STAT. § 25-3-106(a) (ii) (1977) could be processed
as expeditiously as one initiated under Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-110 (1977),
and thus bypass the safeguards provided in the latter section since the
commitment standard is broader and no procedural protections necessarily adhere in the former provision. It is reasonably clear from the
statutory language that the legislature's intent was that the Wyo. STAT.
§ 25-3-110 (1977) procedures govern in the case of an emergency situation
where the alleged mentally ill person potentially may be harmful to
himself or others and he likely would refuse to cooperate in obtaining a
medical diagnosis of his condition. Based on this author's conversations
with various judges and prosecutors within Wyoming, the prevailing
interpretation of these statutes seems to be that WYO. STAT. § 25-3-110
(1977)
sets forth the applicable emergency commitment procedures.
Additionally, state ho.pital statistics for fiscal year 1978 reflect that 22
patients were admitted on a "physician's certificate" (presumably under
WYo. STAT. § 25-3-119 (1977)) and none were admitted as "emergency"
commitments (presumably under WYo. STAT. § 25-3-106(a) (ii) (1977)).
See 1978 ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 38, at 33. Yet Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-106
(a) (ii) (1977) provides a possible "back door" alternative to circumvent
the emergency commitment proceedings. See also text accompanying
footnotes 54-59, supra, and text accompanying footnotes 220-224, infra.
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potentially dangerous may, upon order of a court, be taken
into custody and held for a twenty-four hour period pending
a mental examination by a court-appointed physician."8 6 If
the examining doctor certifies that the proposed patient is
mentally ill and liable to injure himself or others, and the
court concurs after an "appropriate hearing" held within
forty-eight hours after the doctor's certification is filed,
then the individual may be committed to the state hospital.8 7
The statute further provides that the individual may be
present and testify at the hearing, and he may be accompanied by counsel.188 During these proceedings the detained
individual may be held in appropriate facilities, and during
an "extreme emergency" he may be placed in the county
jail. ' No comparable procedural requirements accompany
the hospitalization of an individual who qualifies for admission by virtue of his mental illness and his need for care or
Therefore, this section will first focus on the
treatment.'
sufficiency of the prescribed emergency commitment procedures in the case of potentially dangerous persons, then address the propriety of parens patriae-based emergency commitment.
The constitutional problems inherent in state emergency commitment statutes include the validity of the standards governing detention, the necessity for a precommitment hearing, the timing of such a hearing and the applicability of procedural safeguards at the hearing.' Necessarily
in the emergency commitment context the interests of the
individual and the state come into tension: the individual's
interest includes retention of his liberty and the avoidance
of the stigmatization and possible adverse effects of even
short term involuntary hospitalization; the state's interest
is the need for prompt action to protect society and its need
for time to accurately diagnose and provide for the allegedly
186. WYO.
187. WYo.

STAT.
STAT.

§ 25-3-110(a) (1977).
§ 25-3-110(b),
§ 25-3-110(b)

(d)

(1977).

(1977).

188.

WYO. STAT.

189.

WYo. STAT. § 25-3-114 (1977).

(1977). See also text accompanying
190. Wyo. Stat. § 25-3-106(a)(ii)(C)
footnotes 54-59, supra.
191. See Roth, Daylcy and Lerner, supra note 124; Developments, supra note
56, at 1275-1279.
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The Supreme Court has provided some
mentally ill person.'
guidance with its recognition that basic constitutional requirements are satisfied so long as the nature and duration
of commitment are reasonably related to the purpose for
Further, in McNeil v.
which the individual is committed.'
4
Director, Patuxent Institution,.. the Court observed: "If
the commitment is properly regarded as a short-term confinement with a limited purpose ... then lesser safeguards
may be appropriate, but by the same token, the duration of
the confinement must be strictly limited."1 "' Relying upon
this precedent, lower courts have held that state emergency
commitment proceedings properly limited to potentially
dangerous persons and properly conducted to assure reasonably prompt judicial involvement and basic procedural protections, satisfy minimum due process requirements.9 6 By
limiting summary emergency proceedings to dangerousnessbased commitments, the Wyoming statute appears to address compelling state interests in assuring protection of the
individual or society, and therefore seems to meet substantive due process standards applicable when individual liberty
9 7 Similarly, the Wyoming statutory requirement
is at stake."
of a judicial hearing within forty-eight (48) hours after an
individual has been medically certified as mentally ill and
likely to injure himself or others' meets or exceeds the most
stringent time limitations suggested by any of the courts
which have considered and imposed specific time requirements for initial probable cause hearings after an individual
has been taken into custody for emergency reasons.' 99
192. See Developments, supra note 56, at 1275-76.
193. Jackson v. Indiana, supra note 3, at 738.
194. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, supra note 3. In McNeil, the
Court discharged the petitioner from the respondent's custody after finding that his ex parte commitment for observation as a defective delinquent, which had lasted for six years, was unreasonable in view of the
state's original purpose in committing him.
195. Id., at 249.
196. See e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13; Lynch v. Baxley, supra
note 15; Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, supra note 14; Doremus
v. Farrell, spra note 17. But see Fhagan v. Miller, 29 N.Y.2d 348, 278
N.E.2d 615 (1972) ; Coll v. Hyland, supra note 22.
197. See Byers v. Solier, 16 Wyo. 232, 93 P. 59 (1907). See also text accompanying footnotes 85-87, supra.
198. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-110(d) (1977).
199. See, e.g., Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1091 (48 hours maximum
period before a probable cause hearing must be held); Bell v. Wayne
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However, while the statute provides for a prompt judicial hearing, it fails to give content to the hearing requirement other than to provide that the individual may be present and testify and he may be accompanied by counsel. The
question posed by these optional procedural safeguards is
whether they meet minimum due process requirements for an
initial, emergency detention proceeding. It should be noted
that some courts, recognizing that due process is a flexible
concept designed to assure fundamental fairness, have suggested that an initial hearing upon an individual's emergency confinement is not required so long as a long term commitment hearing is available promptly and so long as other
safeguards, such as medical review of the commitment or
habeas corpus relief, are available to protect against an improper commitment.2 "' The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Parhamv. J.R., a case involving parental commitment of
minor children to a state hospital, lends additional credence
to this position since the Court held that judicial review of
the commitment was not necessary and it found adequate
protection through the independent medical review procedure of the hospital."0 ' Contrary to the state statutes involved in these cases, however, the Wyoming statutes do not
provide specific time limitations within which a full commitment hearing under Section 25-3-112 of the Wyoming
Other courts, after balancing the
Statutes must be held. 02
County General Hospital, supra note 14, at 1098 (five day maximum
period before a probable cause hearing must be held); Lynch v. Baxley,
supra note 15, at 388 (seven day maximum period before a probable
cause hearing must be held). See also Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265
(D.Conn. 1972) aff'd sub nom., Briggs v. Arafeh, 411 U.S. 911 (1973)
(45 day commitment prior to a hearing was not unreasonably long and
did not constitute a due process violation).
200. Logan v. Arafeh, supra note 199; French v. Blackburn, supra note 22; Coll
v. Hyland, supra note 22.
201. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3. Parham clearly is distinguishable from the
situation of the commitment of an adult to a state institution because
the Court was straining in Parham to reconcile the conflicting interests
of a parent and child which adhere in the juvenile commitment context.
It was as a result of the Court's balancing of these interests that
relaxed procedural protections were accepted. 99 S.Ct. at 2506. The
same conflict does not arise in the case of an adult commitment. But it
still is significant that the Court did not think that judicial review was
constitutionally required or that it assured any greater protection to
the individual than other forms of independent review given the medical
nature of the underlying commitment decision. 99 S.Ct. at 2506 But cf.
Morrissey v. Brewer, supra note 12 (initial probable cause hearing
required before parole revocation; judicial involvement not required).
202. The only time limitation provided in Wyoming commitment statutes
applicable to the commitment hearing is found in Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-112
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individual and state interests at stake, have concluded that
due process requires a prompt probable cause hearing preceded by notice to the individual, his presence at the proceedings unless it is waived by his counsel, and representation by counsel (appointed if necessary) . 2 03 These courts
generally have stopped short of requiring that all adverse
witnesses, including the certifying physician, be present and
available for cross examination; rather they suggest that
their presence be required only if the proposed patient's
counsel offers contrary proof or desires to challenge the factual accuracy of their reports.2 - " The significant liberty
interests implicated, and the real possibility of stigmatization and deleterious consequences attached to an erroneous
commitment, even a short term one, suggest that this minimum procedural regularity is required. -"°
Therefore, the optional language in Section 25-3-110 (b)
of the Wyoming Statutes regarding the individual's presence and his right to counsel at this preliminary hearing
renders the statute constitutionally suspect. Also, no provision is made to provide notice to the individual of the pro(d) (1977) which provides that the initial medical examination by the
court-appointed physician must be completed within seven days after the
individual is provided notice of the hearing. The statute does provide,
however, that the hearing must be scheduled expeditiously. WYO. STAT.
§ 25-3-112(f) (1977). Also the Wyoming statutes recognize that if a
hospitalized individual (presumably an emergency patient) requests his
release from the hospital, the hospital must initiate involuntary hospitalization proceedings within forty-eight (48) hours by filing an application
for WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112 (1977) proceedings. Additionally, medical
review of the original commitment is assured since the state hospital
must examine all patients within 10 days of their admission. Wyo. STAT.
§§ 25 3-111, 25-3-117 (1977). See also Section V, infra.
203. In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C.Cir. 1971); Bell v. Wayne County
General Hospital, supra note 14; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13;
Doremus v. Farrell, supra note 17; Wessell v. Pryor, supra note 101. Cf.
Heryford v. Parker, supra note 2 (right to counsel at all stages in commitment of mentally retarded person). But see Stone, supra note 41, at 58.
Stone argues that the function of an attorney at an emergency commitment
hearing should be similar to that served by an attorney at a grand jury
hearing-simply to advise the client outside of the hearing, but not to participate as an adversary.
204. See e.g., In re Barnard, id. at 1374; Kendall v. True, supra note 21, at 419.
205. In re Barnard, id. at 1375. ("When personal freedom is at issue due
process at least demands that a person's legal status be determined at
the earliest possible time.") See Addington v. Texas, supra note 3, at
1809; Wexler and Scoville, supra note 128, at 118. See also, In re Curry,
452 F.2d 1360 (D.C.Cir. 1971) (During 1970, of 1,702 persons in the
District of Columbia who were authorized to be committed on an emergency basis for seven days, only 331 eventually were judicially committed
on a long-term basis.).
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°
ceedings, which breaches fundamental due process notions." "
Additionally, the statute fails to set forth who bears the
burden of proof and which standard of proof applies."0 7 It
seems clear that the state must bear this burden since it is
acting to detain an individual; and, after the Addington v.
Texas ruling,"' it appears that the "clear and convincing"
evidentiary standard of proof should apply. Application
of these procedural safeguards perhaps alters the nature
of the proceedings from a rather summary probable cause
hearing to a more substantial inquiry into the basis of the
state's commitment action, but it should not impose impossible burdens on the courts who already are charged with
the responsibility for carrying out this initial hearing. By
not imposing an absolute right to cross examination of the
certifying physician, severe logistical problems of coordinating judicial and medical schedules can be avoided while still
assuring that a court independently scrutinizes the initial
commitment decision to assure that hospitalization is proper.
Moreover, adoption of these basic procedures would clarify
the ambiguous "appropriate hearing" language in Section
25-3-110(b) of the Wyoming Statutes and assure statewide
regularity in the handling of emergency commitments.
While it might be argued that imposition of a more formal
preliminary hearing requirement might undercut the prompt
treatment rationale of the emergency commitment provisions, it must be recognized that persons who find themselves summarily institutionalized and subjected to unwanted psychiatric treatment are likely to be suspicious and
resist efforts to assist them. They may also suffer additional
psychological difficulties, as feelings of paranoia or persecution likely would be reinforced as a result of this experience."0 ' Thus, imposition of these minimal procedural safe206. See cases cited note 198, supra.
207. See Note, "We're Only Trying to Help": The Burden and Standard of
Proof in Short Term Civil Commitment, 31 STAN. L. REV. 425 (1979).
208. Addington v. Texas, supra note 3. See text accompanying notes 287-291,
infra.
209. See Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1091, n. 18 citing the testimony
of Arthur Cohen, National Capital Area Civil Liberties Union and
American Civil Liberties Union, before a 1970 ocngressional committee:
Although 7 days may not appear to some to be a very long time,
experience has indicated that any kind of forcible detention of a
person in an alien environment may seriously affect him in the
first few days of detention, leading to all sorts of acute traumatic
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guards during the emergency commitment process would
clarify existing statutory requirements and insulate the
Wyoming procedures from constitutional challenge without
substantially increasing the workload of local courts.
An additional problem in the emergency commitment
context is the question of whether the state may legally confine alleged mentally ill individuals facing examination by a
doctor or an emergency commitment hearing in a county
jail, as provided for in Section 25-3-114 of the Wyoming
Statutes. As noted, the Supreme Court has held that due
process requires the nature and duration of a commitment
to be reasonably related to the purpose for the commitment.21
The Court also has held that the infliction of penal sanctions
based upon an individual's status constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.2 1 ' Additionally, the Court has recognized
in the procedural due process context that the state may act
summarily in an emergency situation. 1 ' Relying upon these
principles, lower courts have concluded that improper institutional placement upon commitment can constitute a constitutional violation, but there do not appear to be any cases
directly addressing the question of the propriety of temporary detention in a jail of a mentally ill person who has
13
not committed a criminal offense.

210.
211.

212.
213.

and iatrogenic symptoms and troubles. By 'iatrogenic' I mean
things that are caused by the very act of hospitalization which
is supposed to be therapeutic; in other words, the hospitalization
process itself causes the disturbance rather than the disturbance
requiring hospitalization.
See also Roth, Dayley and Lerner, supra note 124, at 416.
Jackson v. Indiana, supra note 3, at 738.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962). While Robinson dealt
with the imprisonment of a drug addict, its rationale proscribing imprisonment based upon an individual's status seems directly analogous
to the situation posed when a mentally ill individual who has committed
no criminal offense is incarcerated in a penal facility.
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971). See also, Ploof v. Brooks,
342 F. Supp. 999, 1005 (D.Vt. 1972).
Ploof v. Brooks, supra note 212 (transfer of moderately mentally ill
patient to maximum security state hospital) ; Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous,
33 N.Y.2d 161, N.E.2d 903 (1973) (transfer of civilly committed patient
to maximum security hospital operated by state department of corrections).
Lower court cases also indicate that once the state deprives an individual
of his liberty for purposes of involuntary civil commitment, then the state
is obligated to provide treatment to the person. Welsch v. Likins, supra
note 184, approving Welsch v. Likins, supra note 167; Wyatt v. Aderhold,
503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). Incarceration in a county jail is plainly
anti-therapeutic and it is highly unlikely that any treatment will be
provided there.
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Frequently emergency commitment situations are
brought to the attention of the police in the first instance.
Prompt action often is called for in a psychiatric emergency
and after initial intervention, some continuing restraint may
be necessary to protect either the individual or the public.
Unfortunately, appropriate detention facilities are not uniformly available throughout Wyoming although some form
of professional attention should be. 14 Where detention is
necessary, the Wyoming statute provides that commitment
to the county jail is proper only in an emergency. 15 This
implies that all alternative detention facilities must be exhausted before the proposed patient may be placed in jail. 16
Additionally, the statutes governing emergency commitment
do provide for a prompt hearing within forty-eight hours,
thus assuring that the detention will be temporary.21 Given
these facts, relevant constitutional principles may not be
offended by temporary detention in a jail facility so long as
the detention is compelled by emergency circumstances that
cannot otherwise be handled and its duration is brief. Additionally, segregation from the facility's criminal population is appropriate to assure that the confinement is not
penal in nature." 8 Further, the authorities rather clearly
have a constitutional duty under these circumstances to insure the individual against any bodily harm, either at the
hands of other inmates or staff.'
The Wyoming statutes also seem to provide for parens
patriae-based emergency commitments. 2 1 Section 25-3-106
214. Testimony of W. Don Nelson, Director of the Department of Health and
Social Services, and Dr. Ray Muhr, Southwest Wyoming Mental Health
Center, before the Joint Interim Subcommittee, supra note 38.
215. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-114 (1977).
216. Assuming the accuracy of the estimates of Mr. Nelson and Dr. Muhr in
their testimony before the Joint Interim Subcommittee, supra note 38,
comprehensive mental health services presently should be available in
approximately one half of the state's counties. Therefore, at least in
these counties, detention of proposed patients in the county jails should
be avoided in all cases, including extreme emergency situations.
217. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-110(d) (1977).
218. Cf. Robinson v. California, supra note 211.
219. Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804, (8th Cir. 1978); Harper v.
Cserr, 544 F.2d 1121, 1123 (1st Cir. 1976) ; New York State Association
for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 764 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
220. Although the article distinguishes dangerousness-based commitments from
parens patriae-based commitments, the line between the two is not so
clear. As the court noted in Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 390,
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(a) (ii) (C) of the Wyoming Statutes provides for hospital
admission of mentally ill individuals who require care or
treatment but are unable to provide responsibly for their
own hospitalization. No statutory provision requires judicial intervention prior to their commitment to the hospital,
although they are entitled to request their release after they
have been admitted, which will trigger judicial proceedings
if the hospital determines that they should remain as patients.22 ' Since this article takes the position that parens
patriae-grounded commitments are constitutionally suspect
and essentially unnecessary in view of the expansive potential of the dangerousness commitment standard,222 it is even
more difficult to justify the possibility of such a parens
patriae commitment on an emergency basis. It is hard to
imagine that a parens patriae-based emergency commitment
would present a situation not already covered by the existing statutes establishing procedures for the emergency commitment of potentially dangerous persons: a person who
may require care or treatment hardly presents an emergency situation justifying reduced procedural safeguards
unless he also is possibly dangerous either to himself or
others. In that event, the existing statutes provide the state
with a vehicle for dealing with the problem and assuring the
individual of some procedural regularity before he is com" ' Additionally, in the absence
mitted to the state hospital.22
of a real emergency situation, the complete lack of procedural
safeguards cannot be justified; particularly since the critical
question in such a commitment is the individual's capacity
to decide about his own hospitalization-an issue that tracommitments accomplished because the individual potentially is harmful
to himself derive from both the state's police power and its patens
patriae authority. Reference to parens patriae-based emergency commitments here is confined to those commitments sanctioned on the basis of
the individual's need for care or treatment as specified in Wyo. STAT.
§ 25-3-106(a) (ii) (C) (1977).
221. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-108(a) (iv) (1977). Significantly, Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-108
(b) (1977) provides that no judicial proceedings concerning patients
hospitalized pursuant to Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-106 shall be commenced until
the patient requests release from the hospital. Notwithstanding the fact
that the hospitalization may have been involuntary in the first instance
(WYO. STAT. § 25-3-106(a) (ii) (1977)), the statute puts the burden on
the patient to secure a judicial hearing on the legality of his commitment.
Therefore, no judicial review is assured-it is available only if the patient
is able to make his way to the courthouse!
222. See Section II, supra.
223. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-110 (1977). See preceeding text in this Section.
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ditionally has been resolved by the courts.224 Therefore, retention of the patrens patriae alternative for emergency commitment, even though it is widely avoided by the authorities
charged with administration of the mental health system,
is confusing, unnecessary and most likely unconstitutional.
V. HEARING PROCEDURES

Measuring the procedural protections statutorily incorporated into the Wyoming civil commitment hearing provisions against the plethora of recent court decisions considering the constitutionality of state hearing procedures reveals
some potential constitutional shortcomings in the Wyoming
scheme, along with some generous extensions of constitutional safeguards. Basically, the Wyoming statute provides
that upon initiation of commitment proceedings and upon
affirmation from an appointed examining physician that the
individual requires hospitalization, the court shall give
the individual notice of the scheduled commitment hearing. 25
The court is required to appoint counsel to represent the
proposed patient 2 . and to advise the individual of counsel's
identity before the initial examination is conducted."2 ' The
proposed patient is entitled to be present at the hearing, but
his presence is not required." The hearing is to be conducted informally, 9 but the rules of evidence apply. 30 The
right to a jury trial is statutorily provided.' Also, the court
may utilize a commissioner to conduct the proceedings. 3 '
The basic constitutional issue posed by these procedures is
224. See Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 391; Colyar v. Third Judicial
Court for Salt Lake County, supra note 27 at 434. The courts historically
and contemporarily have been charged with responsibility for determining
the competence of individuals brought before them, either in the commitment context or in other contexts. See e.g., Wyo. STAT. § 3-2-101 et. seq.
(1977).
225. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(f) (1977). See also, Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-112(d)
(1977) specifying that notice should be provided to the proposed patient
upon the initial filing of an application for involuntary hospitalization,
but permitting the court to forego notice to the proposed patient if, in
the court's judgment, it would be in his best interests not to send him
notice.
226. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(g) (1977).
227. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(d) (1977).
228. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(h) (1977).
229. Id.
230. Holm v. State, supra note 2.
231. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(j) (1977).

232. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(m) (1977).
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whether minimum procedural due process requirements are
satisfied.
The Supreme Court has adopted a balancing approach
in determining the scope of procedural protections constitutionally required where state action infringes protected liberty or property interests. 3 ' According to the Court, it is
necessary to balance:
First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or
234 substitute procedures requirement would entail.
In the civil commitment context, the Court has recognized
that a significant liberty interest is at stake when the state
acts to involuntarily hospitalize someone for an indefinite
period of time. 3 ' In recognition of this fact, several courts
have felt constitutionally compelled to extend virtually the
full complement of criminal law procedural protections to
state civil commitment proceedings,"3 6 while others have
stopped short of such a wholesale expropriation." 7 For the
sake of clarity, and in order to properly evaluate the Wyoming provisions, this article will examine the statutory requirements individually, mindful of the Court's balancing
test, then proceed to consider additional protections which
might be required.
The Wyoming statute provides that notice be twice given
to an individual facing possible commitment. Initially, no233. See e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, supra note 12; Mathews v. Eldridge, supra
note 141.
234. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra note 141, at 335; Smith v. O.F.F.E.R., 431 U.S.
816, 847-848 (1977). See also Parham v. J.R., supra note 3, at 2502.
235. Huhphrey v. Cady, supra note 3; Addington v. Texas, supra note 3, at 1809;
Parham v. J.R., supra note 3, at 2503.
236. Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15; Bell v.
Wayne County Memorial Hospital, supra note 14; State ex rel. Hawks v.
Lazaro, supra note 16; Doremus v. Farrell, supra note 17; Stamus v.
Leonhardt, supra note 20; Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681
(Ky. 1962); Dixon v. Attorney General, supra note 18.
237. Coll v. Hyland, supra note 22; In re Beverly, supra note 22; French v.
Blackburn, supra note 22.
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tice is given to the proposed patient upon the filing of an
application for involuntary hospitalization, unless the court
finds that such notice may be injurious to the person."'
This notice must inform the individual of the purpose of the
proceeding, the identity of the physician appointed to examine the individual, the individual's right to counsel or the
identity of legal counsel appointed to represent him, and that
a hearing will be conducted if the physician certifies that
hospitalization is required." The statute also provides that
after the examining physician has submitted his report, if
he recommends hospitalization, a second notice will be given
to the individual of the date of the hearing, which must be
scheduled as expeditiously as practicable. 4 ' This two-part
notice scheme presents possible constitutional problems in
view of statutory ambiguity as to the necessity, timing and
content of notice.
The Supreme Court has held that prior notice of pending proceedings is an elementary and fundamental aspect
of due process.24 ' The Court has held that notice must afford a reasonable time for those interested to appear and it
must provide adequate information to enable them to prepare to present their objections. 42 Elaborating upon these
concepts in In re Gault, the Court held that in juvenile delinquency proceedings, prior notice of the hearing must be provided at the earliest practicable date, and must include particular allegations of the misconduct and advise the juvenile
of his right to representation by counsel. 43 Analogizing to
this precedent, courts confronted with challenges to the adequacy of notice in civil commitment statutes uniformly have
held that notice must be given sufficiently in advance to allow
adequate preparation."' It also has been held that notice to
the individual facing commitment is mandatory. 4 ' In addiWYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(d) (1977).
Id.
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(f) (1977).
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
Id. at 314.
In re Gault, supra note 91, at 33, 41.
See e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 388; French v. Blackburn,
supra note 22, at 1357.
245. Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1092; Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra
note 19, at 1127. The courts made short shrift of the argument that
mandatory notice may aggravate the individual's mental condition, point238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
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tion, it has been held that the notice must advise the individual of his right to counsel, contain a statement of the standards governing commitment, include a detailed statement
of the basis for the proposed commitment and the underlying facts or supporting testimony."' The courts appear to
be split over whether it is necessary to advise the individual
of the names of witnesses who may testify against him or
to include a summary of their proposed testimony." 7
Based upon this precedent, the Wyoming provision
which makes initial notification to the individual of the
filing of an involuntary hospitalization application optional
may be constitutionally inadequate."' It can be argued that
the statutory requirement of notice before the actual hearing appears to be mandatory, 4 ' thus assuring the individual
notice of the proceedings. However, it is the first notice,
not the second, which requires advisement of the right to
counsel and the purpose of the proceedings. 25 The statute
is silent as to whether the second notice must contain anything other than notice of the time and place of the hearing.
Therefore, to the extent that the second notice fails to meet
minimum due process content requirements, the optional
nature of the initial notice is constitutionally deficient.
Secondly, assuming that the proposed patient receives
the prescribed initial notice, he still is not assured that he
will be advised of the ultimate basis for the commitment
hearing since no provision is made to advise him of the
factual basis or reasons underlying the proceedings. 5- 1 Pre-

246.

247.
248.
249.
250.

251.

ing out that this assumed the individual was mentally ill and a proper
subject for commitment - a fact yet to be determined at the commitment hearing. See also, Developments, supra note 56, at 1274.
Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 388; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13,
at 1092; Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra note 19, at 1127; State ex rel.
Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16, at 124. But see Coll v. Hyland, supra
note 22, at 911; French v. Blackburn, supra note 22, at 1357 n. 10.
Compare Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1092 and Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra note 19, at 1127 with Coll v. Hyland, supra note 22, at 911 and
French v. Blackburn, supra note 22, at 1356-1357.
See Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra note 19, at 1127.
WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(f) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(d) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(d) (1977)

provides that notice shall advise the
individual of the purpose of the proceeding; however, this does not mean
that he will be apprised of the basis upon which his commitment is sought.
But cf. French v. Blackburn, supra note 22, at 1357 (the court found it
adequate that the notice advised the individual that he was a proper
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sumably, however, he will be represented by counsel by this
time, 2 ' and it has been held that the availability of counsel
mitigates detailed notice requirements including the supporting facts or testimony to be marshalled in support of the
commitment." 3 But the weight of authority supports disclosure of the basis for the commitment proceedings," 4 and
this appears consistent with fundamental due process
principles.
Finally, the Wyoming statute makes no express provision for when notice must be given. Generally, the courts
addressing the question have contented themselves with the
requirement that notice must be given sufficiently in advance of the proceedings to allow adequate preparation. 55
As short a time as forty-eight (48) hours in advance has
been held constitutionally adequate in view of the availability
of a continuance. 2 6 While the Wyoming statute implies that
the hearing will follow quickly once notice has been given, 57
there is no reason to suppose that a continuance would not be
available to unprepared counsel. 5 Moreover, assuming that
the initial notice following the filing of the application
has been given and that counsel has been appointed, that
should provide sufficient prior warning of the possibility of
an eventual commitment hearing to permit initial preparation and investigation. Therefore, the statute's failure to
establish a detailed time schedule for notice prior to the
hearing probably is not constitutionally invalid on its face,
although the possibility exists for unconstitutional application.
Representation by counsel is constitutionally required in
civil commitment proceedings, 5 and the Wyoming statutes
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

259.

subject for commitment and that it was unnecessary to serve a copy of
the original petition or affidavit filed to initiate the proceedings).
Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-112(d) (1977) provides for court appointment of
counsel immediately upon the filing of the application for commitment
and simultaneous with the appointment of an examining physician.
Coll v. Hyland, supra note 23, at 911.
See cases cited note 21, supra.
Id.
French v. Blackburn, supra note 22, at 1357.
WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(f) (1977) provides that once the appointed
examining physician certifies to the court that the individual qualifies
for commitment, then the court must schedule a hearing "expeditiously."
WYOMING UNIFORM DISTRICT COURT RuLES, Rule 7.
Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 389. Cf. Heryford v. Parker, supra
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provide for such representation, including appointed counsel
if the individual cannot afford an attorney.26 Since the
statute provides for the appointment of counsel immediately
upon the filing of the involuntary hospitalization application,
the proposed patient is assured the assistance of counsel
continuously throughout the proceedings. 2"' Facially, the
statute is constitutionally adequate. But, the difficult questions concern not the right to counsel, but the role which
counsel is required to play in representing the individual
during the commitment proceedings. 262 Here the statute
provides only that counsel shall represent the proposed patient at hearings, advise him of his rights, and advise him
or his spouse or relative as to the advisability of guardianship proceedings.26 The statute also states that the commitment proceedings are not adversary and shall be conducted as informally as possible." ' To the extent that this
suggests counsel's role differs from his traditional adversarial role, it is inconsistent with pertinent ethical strictures" and the weight of authority.266 It is clear that counsel is charged with the responsibility to forcefully advocate
his client's interests, including the assertion of defenses to
the commitment even if he may harbor the personal opinion
the commitment might be appropriate.267 However, the

260.
261.

262.

263.
264.
265.

note 2 (right to counsel at all stages in commitment proceedings for the
mentally retarded).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(d) and (g) (1977).
The courts consistently have held that the right to counsel attaches prior
to any preliminary hearing which might be scheduled to determine
whether the patient should be hospitalized pending a final commitment
hearing. See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 388; Doremus v.
Farrell, supra note 17, at 515. To the extent that Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-110(b)
(1977) does not provide an absolute right to appointed counsel at the
preliminary detention hearing for those persons hospitalized upon medical
certification, it is constitutionally deficient. See Section IV, supra.
See Developments, supra note 56, at 1288-1291; Cohen, The Function of
the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally 111, 44 TEx. L. Rev. 424
(1966) ; Lockney, Constitutional Problems with Civil Commitment of
the Mentally Ill in North Dakota, 52 N. DAK. L. REv. 83, 92-95 (1975).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(g) (1977).
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(C) and (h) (1977). But see Holm v. State, supra
note 2.
Canon 7 of the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, requires a lawyer

to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law. See Canon
7, Ethical Consideralions 4 and 19. See also State ex rel. Hawks v.
Lazaro, supra note 16, at 126.
266. Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 399. State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro,
supra note 16, at 126; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1099-1100.
267. See Developments, supra note 56, at 1288-1291. (This article does suggest
that in the instance of certain parens patriae-based commitments, counsel
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courts have noted that the right to counsel does not
extend to preliminary information-gathering proceedings
such as psychiatric interviews. " ' Insertion of counsel into
this phase of the commitment process could interfere with
the objectivity of medical judgments critical to the question
of whether to proceed with the hearing. Thus, while recognizing that counsel plays a crucial role in representing the
proposed patient's interests, the courts have stopped short of
bringing counsel into every phase of the commitment process.
Application of the Wyoming statute consistent with these
principles should meet constitutional requirements.
The Wyoming statute recognizes that the proposed patient may be present at the proceedings, but that his presence is not required."0 9 No standards are set forth to guide
the court in determining when the patient's presence is not required. The question of whether the individual's presence is
absolutely required at the hearing has been much litigated, 7 '
with the usual result that in appropriate cases he may be
excused. 27 ' Courts have held that the proposed patient must
be present unless his presence is waived either by himself
or his counsel, 272 or unless his presence is so disruptive that
the hearing cannot reasonably continue. 73 While it has been
recognized that subjecting an individual to commitment proceedings may be detrimental to his psychological health,2"4
contrary benefits are evident: the individual can participate and assure that his interests are being protected; he
presumably will feel that he at least was accorded rudimen268.
269.

270.
271.
272.

273.
274.

may be excused from his traditional adversarial role.) See also Cohen,
supra note 262.
See cases cited note 266, supra.
WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(h) (1977).
See, e.g., Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 5, at 388-389; Kendall v. True, supra
note 21, at 419; Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, supra note 14, at
1094; Stamus v. Leonhardt, supra note 20, at 447.
See cases cited note 270, supra. Contra, State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro,
supra note 16, at 124-125 ("The subject individual, just as a criminal defendant, must be present in person and cannot waive that right.").
See Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 388-389; Kendall v. True, supra
note 21, at 419. With respect to waiver of the right to be present by
the individual's counsel, the court in Lynch went so far as to hold that
an adversary hearing must first be held to ascertain the appropriateness
of the waiver. 386 F. Supp. at 389.
Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital, supra note 14, at 1094; Doremus
v. Farrell, supra note 17, at 515.
Coll v. Hyland, supra note 22, at 912-913. See also H. DAVIDSON, FORENSIC
PSYCHIATRY 282 (1965).
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tary due process in the event that he ultimately is committed,
thus perhaps making him more cooperative as a patient;
and his presence enables the court to observe his demeanor
and speak with him at the hearing. 75 Additionally, the
courts have held that the right to be present necessarily embraces the right to be free from drugs or medication at the
time of the hearing.1- 0 Psycotropic medication is widely
used to treat a variety of mental illnesses, and often is effective in initially stabilizing and beginning treatment with
But the seriousness of the
severely disturbed individuals.
commitment decision argues against presentation of the
patient to the court in a heavily medicated or sedated state
since this may preclude his effective participation in the
proceedings and, more importantly, likely will provide the
court with an inaccurate or unrepresentative picture of the
individual.27 While the Wyoming statute fails to incorporate any standards governing the proposed patient's absence
from the proceedings, he should be excused only under compelling circumstances. 279 Likewise, unless exceptional circumstances intervene, medication should cease prior to the
hearing. ' Implementation of the statute in this fashion
should avoid any objections based upon its improper application.
275. See Developments, supra note 56, at 1282-1283; Wexler and Scoville,
supra note 128, at 69-73. See also Stamus v. Leonhardt, supra note 20,
at 447. Cf. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3, at 2508 (requiring a confrontational due process hearing before a parent commits his child to a mental
institution may exacerbate family tensions).
276. Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 389; Doremus v. Farrell, supra note
17, at 515; Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13, at 1092. The involuntary
application of psychiatric treatment in any form, including drugs, before
an individual has been afforded an opportunity to contest his detention
also potentially violates the constitutional right of privacy. Bell v. Wayne
County General Hospital, supra note 14, at 1199.
277. See Tourney, Therapeutic Fashions in Psychiatry, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
784 (1968). But see Roth, Dayley and Lerner, supra note 124, at 418.
278. See Developments, supra note 56, at 1282-1283. But see Stone, supra
note 41, at 53.
279. Here, the compelling circumstances properly should include only those situations where the proposed patient in the presence of the court voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently waives his right to be present, and those
situations where the individual's conduct is so disruptive that the proceedings cannot continue. See 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 99
(1977). See also, text accompanying notes 314-319, infra.
280. In this instance, the compelling circumstances should be limited to the
case where continued medication is critically important to assure the
health of the patient. Necessarily, this does not include medication
for the sake of simply controlling the patient or easing the therapeutic
demands on institutional staff. Even this may constitute an invasion of
of the individual's privacy. See note 276, supra.
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While the Wyoming statutes indicate that the hearing
should be conducted informally and nonadversarially, s ' the
Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Holm v. State2 essentially obviates these guidelines, and instead dictates a
more formal proceeding where the rules of evidence are applied. After the Holm decision, it should be clear that the
individual facing commitment has the right to present his
own witnesses... and to confront and cross examine adverse
witnesses. The Holm decision is consistent with the holdings
of other courts which have addressed the question of whether
a right to cross examination exists constitutionally in civil
commitment hearings. " Although this presents logistical
problems to the courts in satisfying the schedules of participating physicians, it offers both the individual, his counsel
and the court an opportunity to fully inquire into the medical basis for the doctor's judgment that commitment is appropriate.8- 5 More importantly, perhaps, the requirement
that physicians appear, testify and subject themselves to
cross examination emphasizes the fact that a legal, rather
than medical decision, ultimately is required when the state
seeks an individual's involuntary hospitalization.286 With incorporation of the Holm requirement into Wyoming commitment proceedings, there should be no constitutional basis for
objection to proceedings which conform to that mandate.
281. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(c) and (h) (1977).
282. Holm v. State, supra note 2. In Holm, the Wyoming Supreme Court
ruled unconstitutional on due process grounds that portion of Wyo. STAAT.
§ 25-3-112(h) (1977) which provided that the court conducting a civil
commitment hearing was not bound by the rules of evidence.
283. Since the proceedings occur in the district court, the court's subpoena
power should be available to the proposed patient. WYo. R. Civ. P., Rule
45.
284. See cases cited not 236, supra.
285. It has been argued that rigid application of the rules of evidence may
infringe substantially on the ability of mental health facilities to effectively treat patients since a considerable amount of staff time would
be taken up appearing and testifying at hearings. Stone, supra note 41,
at 56. The traditional response to this argument has been that where
liberty is at stake due process demands no less. See, e.g., Holm v. State,
supra note 2, at 743. Also, the hearsay rules admit of numerous exceptions, and there is no reason why courts could not adopt bifurcated proceedings in the civil commitment context as utilized by juvenile courts,
initially inquiring as to whether the individual meets the commitment
criteria and, secondly, pursuant to less formal procedures, inquiring into
the appropriate disposition for the patient.
TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

See JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION

(1975).

286. Compare Addington v. Texas, supra note 3, at 1811 with Parham v. J.R.,
supra note 3, at 2507.
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No statutory provision sets forth the applicable standard of proof in Wyoming commitment proceedings. The
question of whether the stringent "beyond a reasonable
doubt" criminal standard of proof applies in state civil commitment proceedings or whether a lesser standard is appropriate has been widely debated.87 and variously decided,28
but the Supreme Court's recent decision in Addington v.
Texas... holds that an intermediate standard requiring "clear
and convincing" proof is sufficient to meet federal due
process constitutional requirements. 9 ' In refusing to apply
the more stringent criminal evidentiary standard, the Court
emphasized the inherent uncertainty surrounding psychiatric
diagnosis and, balancing this against the individual interests
at stake, it felt that adequate protection was assured under
the intermediate evidentiary standard without thwarting the
State's interest in providing treatment to those who required
it. Of course, states are free to adopt a more stringent standard if they so desire or, as already has occurred, a state's
higbest court may find a more rigorous due process requirement in the state constitution.291 In any event, absent a judicial determination of the applicable standard of proof in
Wyoming, the courts should be on firm constitutional footing
if they comply with the Addington standard.
Wyoming's extension of the right to a jury trial in civil
commitment proceedings probably exceeds minimum constitutional requirements.2 "2 Confronted with the analysis of
the Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,"' where
the Court held that due process did not require jury trials in
287. See Share, The Standard of Proof in Involuntary Civil Commitment
Proceedings, 1977 DET. COLL. L. REV. 209; Ennis and Litwack, supra note
136; Slovenko, Criminal Justice Procedures in Civil Commitment, 24 WAYNE
L. REV. 1 (1977).
288. Compare In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (beyond a reasonable
doubt) and Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13 (beyond a reasonable doubt)
with Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15 (clear, unequivocal and convincing)
and State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16 (clear, cogent and
convincing).
289. Addington v. Texas, eupra note 3.
290. Id. at 1812.
291. Superintendent of Worcester State Hospital v. Hagburg.
Mass.
372 N.E.2d 242 (1978); Lasche v. Commissioner of Public Welfare, 302
Minn. 65, 225 N.W.2d 36e (1h74); cert. denied, 420 U.S. 993 (1974);
Heap v. Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1 (1979).
292. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-112(j) (1977).
293. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
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state juvenile delinquency proceedings, the lower courts have
not found a constitutional right to a jury trial in state civil
commitment proceedings.2 94 Nevertheless, under the Wyoming provision, the benefits of a jury trial are available in
appropriate cases, enabling the judgment of the community,
predicated upon local values, to be brought to bear on the
question of whether the individual facing commitment truly
poses a threat of harm to the populace or himself."'0
The Wyoming statute also provides that the court can
appoint a commissioner to hear civil commitment cases."'0
A due process challenge in Nebraska to a nonjudicial hearing
board charged with responsibility for conducting civil commitment hearings has been rejected."'7 The Supreme Court
in Parham v. J.R. clearly indicated its approval of nonjudicially-conducted commitment proceedings in the context of
parental commitment of children to state mental institutions..2 " This aspect of the Court's rationale in Parhamseemingly is applicable to regular commitment proceedings. 99
Given this precedent and the firm legal basis for the use of
court-appointed commissioners in Wyoming,"°' there is no
reason to suspect that any federal constitutional difficulty
adheres to their participation in civil commitment hearings.
294. Doremus v. Farrell, supra note 17, at 516; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15,
at 394. However, the court in Lynch found an equal protection violation
because the Alabama statutory scheme provided the right to a jury trial
in habeas corpus challenges to a commitment. The court perceived no
rational basis for distinguishing between the two classes of civilly confined
persons. Id. at 395.
295. See Humphrey v. Cady, supra note 3, at 509. See also Developments,
oupra note 56, at 1291-1295.
296. WYO. STAT. 4 25-2-112(m) (1977).
297. Doremus v. Farrell, eupra note 17, at 516.
298. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3, at 2507.
299.
Although we acknowledge the fallibility of medical and psychiatric
diagnosis, see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975)
(concurring opinion), we do not accept the notion that the shortcomings of specialists can always be avoided' by shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of
medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing. Even after a hearing,
the nonspecialist decisionmaker must make a medical-psychiatric
decision. Common human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the supposed protections of an adversary proceeding
to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions for the
commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may
well be more illusory than real. (citations omitted.) Id. at 25072508.
300. WYo. CONST. art. V, § 14; Wyo. STAT. § 5-3-301 (1977).
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Two additional procedural rights - the privilege against
self-incrimination and the right to an independent psychiatric examination-have been asserted on behalf of
individuals facing civil commitment; however, neither has
been widely accepted by the courts. Wyoming statutes do
not provide for either right and there is no reported Wyoming litigation involving either claim. Application of the
privilege against self-incrimination to protect against the
disclosure of prior criminal activity in the civil commitment context is consistent with the Supreme Court's recognition that the privilege is applicable in any type of
proceeding, 0 1 and that application has been recognized as
proper."' However, it has been argued that the privilege is
available during the psychiatric examination to permit the
individual to refuse to divulge non-criminal information
which may render him subject to commitment."° With two
exceptions, 0" the courts have uniformly refused to extend
the privilege into the psychiatric interview. 5 Invocation
of the privilege during the psychiatric interview likely would
undercut any possibility of obtaining a medical diagnosis
or evaluation of the patient's condition."' Since most state
statutes, like the Wyoming statutes, require a showing of
mental illness as part of the basis for commitment, use of
the privilege also might frustrate all commitments regardless of the surrounding circumstances. 0 7 Moreover, in Add301. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 552, 94 (1964) (White, J.
concurring) ; In re Gault, supra note 91, at 49-50.
.02. Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 394; In re Beverly, supra note 22, at
488.
303. Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13; Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15; State
ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 22; French v. Blackburn, supra note
22.
304. Lessard v. Schmidt, supra note 13; Suzuki v. Quisenberry, supra note 19.
305. See cases cited note 303. Cf. Tippett v. State of Maryland, 436 F.2d 1153
(4th Cir. 1971) (privilege unavailable in Maryland defective delinquency
proceedings.).
306. See French v. Blackburn, supra note 22, at 1359. See also, Stone, supra
note 41, at 54; Developments, supra note 56, at 1312. See generally,
Aronson, Should the Privilege Against Self.Incrimination Apply to Compelled Psychiatric Examinations?, 26 STAN. L. REV. 55 (1973) ; Note, Application of the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
to the Civil Commitment Proceeding, 1973 DUKE L. J. 729. But see Suzuki
v. Quisenberry, supra note 19, at 1130-1131 ("The resolution of the conflict
is that if there is no other basis for depriving a person of his liberty than
statements obtained from him for that purpose by an examining physician
who has never seen him before, there should not be any order of
commitment.")
307. See State ex rel. Hawks v. Lazaro, supra note 16, at 126.
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ington v. Texas,"0 8 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of medical diagnosis and interpretation in the
commitment process," °9 which suggests that the Court would
not look favorably upon the imposition of a barrier such as
the privilege between the proposed patient and the doctor
during the diagnostic process.
Commentators have suggested that an independent psychiatric witness would provide additional protection to
the individual facing commitment, 1 ' but no court has
yet required the state to afford an independent expert.
While state provision of an independent psychiatrist
would be costly, and probably frequently unnecessary, it
might provide the benefit of removing any appearance of
official impropriety or bias arising from the use of doctors
employed by the state hospital to conduct the psychiatric
examination."' However, this may not be a serious problem
in Wyoming since the statute provides for local venue for
commitment hearings, 2 and the practice generally is to
conduct the hearings in the proposed patient's home county
before he is transferred to the state hospital.1 Therefore,
in view of the tenuous legal underpinnings for the use of
the privilege or independent experts in the commitment
process, and the burden that their recognition would place
upon the state, it can fairly be concluded that the constitution does not compel their inclusion among the rights available to individuals facing involuntary hospitalization.
308. Addington v. Texas, supra note 3.
"There may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment pro309.
ceeding, but the factual aspects represent only the beginning of
the inquiry, Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous
to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy
turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by
expert psychiatrists and psychologists." Id. at 1811.
310. Cohen, supra note 262, at 458; 2 MENTAL DISABILITY LAW REPORTER 104
(1977).
311. See 2 MENTAL DIrSABILITY LAW REPORTER 104 (1977).
312. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-112(a) (1977).
313. Statement of Judge Robert Hill, District Court Judge for the Second
Judicial District, made to the author during a telephone interview on
August 10, 1979. Additional benefits from holding commitment hearings
in the proposed patient's home county is that evidence should be readily
available, the family can be consulted and participate, and there is the
likelihood that the court and other officials may have some familiarity
with the individual and his situation. Such a practice also avoids a
judicial overload in Uinta County where the state hospital is located.
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Finally, considering the substantial due process safeguards which are constitutionally compelled in civil commitment proceedings, it is important to address the question of when and how these rights may be waived. The standard for waiver of procedural rights in criminal proceedings
provides a useful starting point: the waiver must be made
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.314 Since even after
a commitment has been ordered no presumption of incompetence attaches,31 it is appealing to simply utilize the
criminal waiver standard. However, as a practical matter
many individuals facing commitment proceedings manifest
substantial mental disability which impairs their ability to
comprehend either the gravity of the proceedings or the
importance of the rights available to them." 6 This fact suggests that careful judicial scrutiny with an acute sensitivity
to the standard of voluntariness and intelligence is necessary
to guard against the improper surrender of a right. Therefore, it seems advisable to consider the right to counsel
unwaivable. 17 Counsel can provide invaluable assistance to
the courts, as well as the individual, by assuring that the
proposed patient has been carefully advised of his rights
and the nature of the proceedings. But counsel often can
experience real frustration in dealing with the seriously
disabled or uncommunicative individual. Thus, the court
must carefully evaluate waivers offered by counsel to assure
that they are forthcoming with the client's consent."' Perhaps, most importantly, any waiver of the individual's presence at the hearing should call for careful judicial review,
including at least a meeting between the court and the
individual to ascertain that he appreciates and understands
the decision to waive his presence.31 This serves the additional purpose of enabling the court to observe the individual
and his behavior, thereby providing the court with further
314. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ; Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1 (1973).
315. Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-125 (1977); WYo. STAT. § 25-3-124(d) (1977).
It
should be noted that as a practical matter, unless a person has substantial
property or assets, the question of his competency often will not be presented to a court.
316. See Developments, supra note 56, at 1315.
317. Id. at 1316.
318. See Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568 (Wash. 1973); Lynch v. Baxley, supra
note 15, at 396.
319. See note 279, supra. Cf. Lynch v. Baxley, supra note 15, at 389.
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insight into the commitment question. Although this might
entail some additional judicial time, the allowance for
waiver through the careful application of the criminal
standard coupled with the requirement of representation
by counsel in every instance should assure constitutionally
adequate proceedings without imposing a rigid straightjacket on counsel or the court.
VI.

REVIEW, RELEASE AND TRANSFER

Current Wyoming statutes governing review of a patient's condition, his release from the hospital, or his transfer to another institution provide the head of the hospital
with the authority to reach these decisions. Specifically,
the head of the hospital is required to periodically examine
each patient within six month intervals to determine
whether the patient's condition justifies continued hospitalization.2 ° He is granted the authority to discharge
patients 21 ' or to release them temporarily on convalescent

leave status.2 The hospital head must review annually all
convalescent status patients and he may subsequently discharge them.32 3 He also may revoke a patient's leave and
rehospitalize him if such action is in the patient's "best
interests.' 32 Additionally, patients may be administratively

transferred from institution to institution.2 3 Substantial
320. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-120 (1977).
321. Id. A discharge terminates an outstanding commitment order and frees
the patient from all legal rstraint on his liberty.
322. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-121 (1977). Convalescent leave status permits a visit
or placement outside of the hospital but it does not alter an involuntarily
committed patient's legal status. Convalescent status release essentially
places the patient in limbo since he finds himself out of the hospital and
functioning in the community, yet he remains subject to control by the
hospital since the hospital may revoke his release at any time, thus causing
his return to the hospital as an involuntary patient.
323. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-121(a) (1977).
324. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-121(b) (1977).
Oddly, this transfer authority is gi'ven
325. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-119 (1977).
to the Board of Charities and Reform, the governmental body charged
with the general oversight and supervision of Wyoming penal and mental
institutions. WYO. STAT. § 9-3-706 (1977). Presumably, vesting this authority with the Board rather than with the institutional superintendent is
based upon the Board's oversight role which provides it with a broader
perspective on services available in the various institutions, thus enabling
it to better evaluate the appropriateness of proposed transfers. :As a
practical matter, however, the initial decision of whether to seek an institutional transfer from the state hospital is left to the discretion of
the superintendent. Testimony of Dr. William N. Karns, Superintendent
of the Wyoming state hospital, before the Joint Interim Subcommittee,
supra note 38.
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numbers of patients are affected by these administrative
decisions. For instance, from July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1978,
613 patients were discharged from the state hospital, 210
patients were placed on convalescent status release, and
35 patients were transferred to other state institutions.326
During this same period, 79 patients were returned to the
hospital from convalescent leave status."2 ' Although the considerable discretion vested in the hospital in these matters
facilitates the accomplishment of staff medical objectives,
it also raises possible due process problems. Because significant patient interests are affected by the decisions,
summary procedures may be constitutionally inadequate.
An involuntarily hospitalized patient may not be confined for a period longer than that necessary to accomplish
the purpose for his original commitment.2 This principle
is not theoretical: O'Connor v. Donaldson329 suggests that
prolonged improper commitment opens the officials involved, and possibly the State, to possible liability through
a damage suit.33 Most state statutes provide for periodic
medical or judicial review of a patient's mental condition
on a regular basis. 3" ' The Wyoming statutes specify that
such a review must be conducted at six month intervals,
and that when "the conditions justifying hospitalization no
longer exist," the patient must be discharged.32 This reviewrelease standard, while perhaps inartfully drafted, appears
to incorporate by implication the same standards applied
326. See 1978 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 38, at 31, 34. During the 10 year
period between 1968-1978, an average of 292 patients per year were released from the hospital on convalescent leave status. Id. at 31.
327. Id. at 10, 33. During the 10 year period between 1968-1978, an average
of 95 patients per year were returned to the hospital from convalescent
status release. Significantly, the number of returned convalescent leave
patients during the past three years has been noticably less than this
average figure. Id. at 30.
328. Jackson v. Indiana, supra note 3, at 738; McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Institution, supra note 3.
329. O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra note 5. Mr. Donaldson recovered $38,500
in a jury verdict against the superintendnit of a Florida hospital where
he was confined illegally for 15 years. The Supreme Court remanded
the case for reconsideration of the award, and eventually the suit was
settled for $20,000.
330. See also, Maniaci v. Marquette University, 50 Wis.2d 287, 184 N.W.2d
168 (1971); Goodman v. Parwatikar, supra note 219. Cf. Harper v. Cserr,
aupra note 219.
331. See generally, Developments, supra note 56, at 1382.
332. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-120 (1977).
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in the case of initial hospitalization and, thus, should meet
minimum constitutional requirements."' Any release standard which deviated substantially from the state commitment criteria potentially would violate due process and
equal protection standards since it might permit continued
confinement on a basis inconsistent with the original underlying commitment rationale. 34 Likewise, the Wyoming minimum requirement of six month periodic patient reviews
would appear adequate to meet constitutional considerations underlying the duration of a patient's commitment.
The Wyoming standard is consistent with, or more rigorous
than, those applicable in many other states." 5
The potential problem with the Wyoming periodic
review provision is the fact that review and discharge
determinations are discretionary and are vested in institutional authorities, with no provision for judicial involvement.3 Recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court in Fasulo
v. Arafeh 3 ' invalidated on due process grounds a Connecticut institutional patient review procedure similar to
the Wyoming provision because there was no provision for
subsequent judicial review of the original commitment:
The state's power to confine terminates when the
patient's condition no longer meets the legal standard for commitment. Since the state's power to
confine is measured by a legal standard, the expiration of the state's power can only be determined in a judicial proceeding which tests the
patient's present mental status against the legal
standard for confinement. That adjudication can333.
-334.
335.

336.

337.

See Developments, supra note 56. at 1386; Note, Commitment and Release
Standards and Procedures: Uniform Treatment for the Mentally Ill, 41
U. CHi. L. REV. 825, 830 (1974).
Id.
See Developments, supra note 56, at 1382. (The periodic interval for
statutory review of patient status varies from 3 to 12 months among
the 30 states which require a review, but some statutes simply specify
that the review must be accomplished as often as "practicable".)
Wyoming statutes make no specific provision for judicial review of a
patient's commitment status, but provision is made generally for a patient
to secure review of any proceedings under Wyo. STAT. § 25-3-101 to
§ 25-3-141 (1977) by habeas corpus or a direct appeal to the district
court. Wyo. STAr. § 25-3-124(c) (1977). No detail is provided as to how
the district court is to handle such an appeal: is review de novo or does
the court simply examine the institutional record to determine whether
a reasonable decision was reached?
Fasulo v. Arafeh, supra note 25.
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not be made by medical personnel unguided by the
procedural safeguards which cushion the individual from an overzealous exercise of state power
when the individual is first threatened with the
deprivation of his liberty. 88
Although the Fasulo ruling is based upon the Connecticut
due process clause, the opinion is entitled to more universal
consideration since the court interpreted and applied recent
Supreme Court rulings in arriving at its conclusion that
periodic judicial review was constitutionally mandated.
While the Supreme Court's recent Parham ruling implies
that the Court may not be inclined to extend the hand of
the judiciary too far into the commitment process, the
Court's reluctance may be limited to the special circumstances and conflicting familial interests involved in the
parental commitment of a child to a mental institution." 9
However, the Court also expressed its view that the time
of psychiatric and mental health specialists could more
profitably be spent treating patients rather than in making
courtroom appearances. 4 ° Notwithstanding the rationale of
Parham, Fasulo may foment a series of due process challenges to those state commitment schemes which make no
provision for periodic judicial review of a patient's commitment. If this occurs, Wyoming's provision is vulnerable.
A civilly committed patient may be released on convalescent status if the head of the hospital deems placement
338. Id. at 556. Although Connecticut statutes permitted a patient to initiate
judicial proceedings to review his commitment, the court was concerned
that as a practical matter mental patients would have difficulty overcoming their isolated environment and possible incompetence to initiate
review proceedings. Id. at 557. Furthermore, patient initiated judicial review proceedings threatened to place the burden of proof on the patient
rather than the state. Id. Cf. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3. While holding
that a formal judicial hearing was not constitutionally mandated prior to
parental commitment of a minor to a mental hospital, the court did hold
that periodic, independent review of the initial commitment decision was
necessary. 99 S.Ct. at 2506. See also Note, ProceduralSafeguards for Periodic Review: A New Commitment to Mental Patients' Rights, 88 YALE L. J.
850 (1979).
839. Applying the balancing test of procedural due process in Parham the
Court noted that the private interests at stake included both the child's
interest in the commitment decision and the parents' interest in the
child's welfare and health. 99 S.Ct. at 2503-2504. In balancing these
differing interests the court struck the balance with the parenis and
concluded that a formal judicial hearing was not mandated prior to
commitment, and that independent medical review of the parental decision
was adequate to meet due process requirements.
340. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3 at 2506.
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outside of the hospital to be in the patient's best interests.8" '
In view of the constitutional least restrictive alternative
doctrine. 4 and contemporary professional recognition of the
values of community treatment,"' it is appropriate to permit, and even encourage, the hospital staff to proceed toward
outside placement of the patient whenever, in their judgment, the patient's condition warrants such a change, even
though the patient may still meet the initial commitment
criteria. Medically discretionary judgments appear appropriate here, and imposition of rigid statutory standards
could undermine often beneficial treatment decisions and
placements.
Nevertheless, once a patient has been discharged on
convalescent status he is entitled to constitutional protection to assure that he is treated similarly to other civilly
committed patients and that his liberty interests, even
though conditional, are protected. 44 In this respect, the
Wyoming statute falls short of the constitutional mark.
Patients released on convalescent status are assured a
medical review of their commitment status annually, while
involuntarily hospitalized patients are reviewed at six month
intervals. 4 Considering the growing recognition of the
constitutional requirement of periodic review of a patient's
status,"" this disparity in treament between two classes of
patients may not survive equal protection analysis. In all
likelihood the classification is subject to stringent judicial
review requiring the state to demonstrate that no other
alternative is available to accomplish its purpose. 4 ' Semi841.

WYO. STAT. § 25-3-121(a)

(1977).

342. See Section III, supra.
043. See Stein, Test and Marx, Alternatives to the Hospital: A Controlled
Study, 132

AMERICAN

JOURNAL

OF PSYCHIATRY

517

(1975);

Chambers,

Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical Guides
and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV.

Arnhoff, Social Consequences of

1107

(1972).

But see

Policy Towards Mental Illness, 188

SCIENCE 1277 (1975).

(E.D.Pa. 1975); Lewis v.

344. See Meisel v. Kremens, 405 F. Supp. 1253

Donahue, 437 F. Supp. 112 (W.D.Okl. 1977); In re Anderson, 73 Cal.
Cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra
App.3d 78, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1977).
note 12; Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). But see Dietrich v.

Brooks, 558 P.2d 357 (Ore. Ct. App. 1976).
345.

Compare WYO. STAT. § 25-3-121(1)

(1977)

with WYO.

STAT. §

25-3-120

(1977).
346. Fasulo v. Arafeh, supra note 25. Cf. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3.
347. Fasulo v. Arafeh, supra note 25, at 560 (Bogdanski, J. concurring). Cf.
Shapiro v. Thompson, supra note 12.
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annual review for convalescent status patients suggests
itself as an alternative.
The release standard for patients on convalescent status
poses both due process and equal protection problems. Release is sanctioned if hospitalization is no longer anticipated
in view of the patient's condition.34 In addition to suffering
from ambiguity and lack of clarity, the standard bears no
resemblance to either the initial commitment standard or
the basic discharge standard."' Imposition of any standard
less rigorous than that required for initial hospitalization
cannot be justified under due process analysis in view of
the liberty interests at stake and the strict justification
required of the state where involuntary hospitalization is
concerned."' The same stringent analysis would apply under
equal protection doctrine and, absent a compelling state
interest for the disparate treatment, the statutory release
standard appears deficient." 1
The Wyoming statute provides that a patient's convalescent release status may be summarily revoked if this
is deemed to be within his best interests. 2 Initially, this
procedure poses a problem similar to that raised by the
statutory release procedures: recommitment under a standard less onerous than the initial commitment standard
runs afoul of due process and equal protection guarantees."'
The standard of a patient's best interests does not approach
the threshold comitment requirements of mental illness and
potential dangerousness to self or others, or need for care or
treatment2" Moreover, the summary revocation procedure
cannot withstand a procedural due process challenge. The
348.

WYO.

349.

Compare WYo. STAT. § 25-3-121 (a)
(k), 25-3-120 (1977).

350.

Jackson v. Indiana, supra note 3. See also, Developments, supra note 56,

STAT.

§ 25-3-121(a) (1977).
(1977)

with Wyo. STAT. §§ 25-3-112

at 1386; Note, Commitment and Release Standards and Procedures:
Uniform Treatment for the Mentally I1, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 825, 830
(1974).

351. Id.
352.

WYO. STAT. § 25-3-121 (b)
(1977). The head of the hospital is charged
with the responsibility of reporting to the Board of Charities and Reform

which has the final authority to issue an order for the patient's return to
the hospital that there is reason to believe that the best interests of the
patient would be furthered by rehospitalization.
353. See text accompanying footnotes 350 and 351, supra.
354. See Wyo. STAT. §§ 25-3-106 (a) (ii), 25-3-112(k) (1977).
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Supreme Court held in Morrissey v. Brewer.5 that the
conditional liberty enjoyed by a parolee is constitutionally
significant and is protected against arbitrary deprivation.
Relying upon the Morrissey holding, several lower courts
have held that summary revocation of a patient's convalescent status release violates due process because the patient's liberty interest is substantial enough to entitle him
to prior notice and a hearing before he is returned to the
hospital."5 6 The courts recognized that although medical
judgment was a critical element in the recommitment decision, due process still would not brook summary revocation
procedures. 5 While additional administrative burdens may
result from the requirement of a prior hearing, the constitutional interests implicated by the recommitment decision
are substantial enough to justify the procedures. Probably
the two stage Morrissey parole revocation procedures are
not mandated, 58 but some form of independent review is."'
The Parham holding suggests that it may be sufficient for
the hospital to engage in its own review of the revocation
decision upon the patient's return if this assures an adequate
independent check against an erroneous revocation of apatient's convalescent status. 6 The present statutes mandate that each patient admitted to the state hospital by any
statutory means must be examined by the staff within ten
days of his admission, and he must be released if his
hospitalization is inappropriate. 1 Since the Supreme Court
355. Morrissey v. Brewer, supra note 12. See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra
note 344. But see Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional
U.S ........ ,99 S.Ct. 2100 (1979).
Complex,356. See cases cited note 344, supra.
357. Lewis v. Donahue, supra note 344, at 113; In re Anderson, supra note
344, at 551.
358. See Meisel v. Kremens, supra note 343; Lewis v. Donahue, supra note
344; In re Anderson, supra note 344. In Anderson, the court specifically
refrained from requiring a preliminary probable cause hearing before
initial revocation of a patient's leave status; instead, the court required
a single adversary hearing which included fundamental due process
safeguards. The courts in Meisel and Lewis indicated a reluctance to
dictate any particular procedure for the revocation proceedings.
359. Cf. Fasulo v. Arafeh, supra note 25; Parham v. J.R., supra note 3.
360. See footnotes 339 and 340, supra and accompanying text.
361. WYO. STAT. § 25-3-117 (1977). Dr. William N. Karn, Superintendent of
the Wyoming state hospital, in his testimony before the Joint Legislative
Subcommittee on Involuntary Commitment Procedures, expressed his opinion that present hospital review procedures for returned convalescent
status patients adequately protect the patient against an erroneous
recommitment. Testimony of Dr. Karn before the Joint interim Subcommittee, supra, note 38.
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in Parham declined to consider the scope or nature of the
independent periodic review required in that case,' it is
difficult to predict whether the Court would require an
adversary hearing before an independent decision-maker
upon revocation of a patient's convalescent status release,
as has been required by the lower courts. A strict interpretation of the Morrissey rationale suggests that such a procedure may be required constitutionally. Therefore, the absence of an independent review requirement in the Wyoming
statutory scheme may prove fatally defective.
Similar constitutional problems adhere to the Wyoming
statutory transfer provisions which permit the summary
transfer of patients from the state hospital to other institutions, including the penitentiary."' No procedural rights
are accorded the patient to provide him an opportunity to
challenge the decision if he objects to it. While medical
judgments usually underlie inter-institutional transfer decisions, this fact does not isolate the decision from constitutional scrutiny since liberty interests of the patient potentially are affected by any substantial change in the terms
or conditions of his confinement." 4 The courts are reluctant
to intrude in a hospital's administrative decision-making
process, particularly where medical judgments are involved.3 " Nevertheless, it has been held that transfer of a
patient from a less restrictive institutional setting to a
more restrictive setting requires some procedural regularity
-at least the patient is entitled to an opportunity to contest the decision at an administrative hearing, if he so
desires.' However, in the context of the inter-institutional
transfer of prisoners from one prison to another, the Supreme Court has held that no liberty interest is implicated;
absolute administrative discretion is permissible."' These
362. Parham v. J.R., supra note 3, at 2506 n. 15.
363. WYo. STAT. § 25-3-119 (1977).
364. Williams v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 637 (D.C.Cir. 1970); Eubanks v. Clarke,
434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.Pa. 1977); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, supra
note 213; Cruz v. Ward, 424 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
365. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 624 (D.C.Cir. 1969); Ploof v. Brooks,
supra note 212. Cf. Tribby v. Cameron, 379 F.2d 104 (D.C.Cir. 1967).
366. Id.
367. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montayne v. Haymes, 427 U.S.
236 (1976).
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rulings have been distinguished from patient transfer decisions upon the theory that committed mental patients,
unlike prisoners, are entitled constitutionally to treatment
in the least restictive setting." 8 Although there is little
precedent in this area, to the extent that a patient transfer
from the Wyoming state hospital to another institution
might result in the patient's confinement in a more restrictive environment, the patient may be entitled to prior
opportunity to contest the transfer."' The absence of such
a procedure in Section 25-3-110 of the Wyoming Statutes
at least opens the door to a possible challenge by a patient
dissatisfied with his transfer.
CONCLUSION

As illustrated, numerous constitutional problems present themselves on the face of the Wyoming statutes governing involuntary civil commitment; additional problems
potentially arise in the application of the statutes. Comparing the Wyoming commitment scheme to others which have
been challenged judicially, it is clear that the Wyoming
provisions fall short of evolving constitutional standards.
Although difficult balancing judgments necessarily are involved in weighing the respective interests of the state and
the individual, the state's administrative convenience rarely
will suffice to justify the deprivation of liberty inherent in
civil commitment absent additional countervailing considerations. Even with due deference to the state's considerable
interests in the existing statutory scheme, the constitutional
shortcomings are manifest.
The statutory commitment standards present definitional and possible vagueness problems. "Mental illness" is
poorly defined. No definition is offered for the concept
"likely to injure himself or others." Revision of this portion
368. Eubanks v. Clarke, supra note 364, at 1028. See also, Note, The Interinstitutional Transfer of Involuntarily Committed Mental Patients to
More Restrictive Facilities Without Notice or a Hearing Constitutes a
Violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 51
Cf. Covington v. Harris, supra note 365, at 623.
TEMPLE L. Q. 357 (1978).
369. But the Parham holding suggests that the Supreme Court may strike
the balance against any type of formal administrative hearing in this
situation because of the burden such a proceeding might place upon the
hospital's limited staff resources. 99 S.CL. at 2506.
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of the statute to clearly define and elaborate upon these
terms should protect its validity, and it would provide
guidance for the courts and attorneys involved in commitment proceedings while assuring proper and uniform application of the commitment criteria. The second commitment
standard (mental illness and need for care or treatment) is
inherently overbroad and probably exceeds the state's parens
patriae authority. It should be deleted from the statute.
The purpose underlying the provision is accomplished as
effectively by providing an inclusive definition for the concept of potential dangerousness to oneself which would
embrace the notion of an individual's inability because of
his mental illness to provide for his subsistence. Alternatively, incorporation of an additional commitment standard
such as the "grave disability" criteria utilized in California" ' could accomplish the same purpose. This would
assure compliance with the principle of O'Connor v. Donaldson: it is illegal for a state to commit an individual who
safely can survive in freedom simply because he may benefit
from, or even require, some form of treatment."'
The statutes fail to provide for treament or placement
in an environment less restrictive than the state hospital.
From the standpoint of modernizing the Wyoming civil commitment procedure and assuring constitutional compliance,
it is imperative to incorporate alternate treatment dispositions into the statute. Also, the statute presently fails to
involve local mental health programs in the commitment
process. With the availability and widespread use of chemotherapy, community-based care offers the patient an alternative to institutionalization which can provide stability
in his relationships, proximity to his family or friends, and
a greater degree of independence, and hence self-assurance.
During the initial stages of the commitment process, local
programs could provide valuable assistance in the examination, diagnosis and treatment of individuals who manifest
symptoms of mental illness. Effective early intervention
and treatment could obviate the necessity for commitment,
370. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h) (West 1969).
371. O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra note 5, at 576.
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thus avoiding lengthy judicial proceedings and relieving
the hospital of the need to divert its limited resources from
seriously ill patients to patients who only require short
term stabilization and limited monitoring. Clearly, this
makes more sense than the all-or-nothing choice presently
confronting Wyoming courts.
The provisions governing emergency commitment border on the unintelligible and invite arbitrary and disparate
application. The statute should be revised to clearly reflect
those limited situations in which the state can act with
dispatch to detain and treat a seriously mentally ill person.
An appropriate limitation would permit emergency detention only in those cases which present a life-threatening
situation. Absent such extreme circumstances, the state is
not justified in acting without procedural regularity. Even
in the emergency case, the state is obligated to assure procedural fairness to the detained patient - a probable cause
type of hearing with counsel available should be scheduled
as soon as possible. This assures an independent review of
the detention decision and protects against arbitrariness or
mistake. Further, it would seem advisable and useful to
involve local mental health care facilities in emergency
commitment situations in an effort to assure prompt treatment for the individual and to avoid institutionalization if
possible.
The statutory procedures governing the conduct of involuntary commitment hearings appear constitutionally adequate if they are applied properly. Nevertheless, some
technical problems are evident. If initial notice to the individual is not provided, the second notice provided immediately prior to the hearing probably is inadequate to meet
due process requirements. Waiver of the proposed patient's
presence at the hearing should not be allowed lightly. The
court at least should have the opportunity to observe the
individual at some juncture during the proceedings; this
could be accomplished with an informal waiver interview
between the court and the individual without taxing valuable judicial time. The statute profitably could specify in
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some additional detail the role of counsel in commitment
proceedings. Supplementation of the statute to include the
evidentiary standard of clear and convincing proof is necessary to meet minimum due process mandates. Finally, inclusion of a statutory provision governing the procedure necessary for waiver of the provided rights should assist courts
and counsel in handling the difficult legal, as well as
ethical, issues which naturally arise.
The courts have recognized that an individual's constitutional rights do not lapse once he has been committed
as a patient to a mental hospital. Unfortunately, the present
Wyoming statutes do not assure procedural regularity or
equal treatment in the handling of patient discharges, transfers, or readmissions. The statutes fail to provide discharge
or readmission standards consistent with the initial commitment criteria. It makes little sense to carefully cabin
the state's authority for initial commitment purposes only
to confer virtual unbridled discretion on hospital officials
in the handling of the patient once the commitment order
has been entered. This is particularly true when the commitment order may be several years old and the patient's condition undoubtedly will have undergone several changes
during the interim. Procedural fairness dictates the necessity for independent administrative, if not judicial, review
of the patient's condition periodically to justify continued
hospitalization. Procedural fairness also requires some independent review before a patient on convalescent status
release is summarily recommitted to the hospital. While
judicial review may not be necessary here, independence in
the decision-maker is required. Perhaps the creation of an
independent ombudsman or administrative judge position
within the state mental health system would fulfill these
requirements and assure meaningful administrative review.
Alternatively, more extensive use of commissioners at the
county level to conduct administrative review procedures
along with commitment proceedings could satisfy constitutional review requirements. Either alternative would add
some administrative structure to the existing system and
involve an additional financial outlay, but the benefit would
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lie in relieving the hospital staff of burdensome administrative duties. They could then focus their attention fully on
providing treatment for their patients.
Substantial changes in the existing statute have been
suggested. Their adoption may prove cumbersome at first,
but they presage improvement in a system that has not
changed noticeably in the past sixteen years despite
medical and legal developments which have outstripped the
1963 framework in which the Wyoming system initially
was conceived. Failure to recognize and implement these
changes through legislative revision of the existing statutory
scheme invites piecemeal judicial action - an ultimately
unsatisfactory method for weighing the important interests
at stake and structuring a workable mental health system.
But, in the absence of legislative change, the courts most
likely would be compelled to act to assure that minimum
constitutional standards are met. Preferrably, however,
favorable legislative action will be taken on the revised
commitment statutes which will be forthcoming from the
interim subcommittee appointed for this purpose.
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